Trellio MCP Server

trellio-mcp PyPI v0.14.1

Published by scaratec — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Trello — manage boards, lists, cards, labels, checklists and more

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([download_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [download_attachment] → sinks [create_webhook, delete_webhook]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow download_attachment → create_webhook

Tools 37

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • download_attachmentingests untrusted input
  • add_commentno sensitive capability
  • add_label_to_cardno sensitive capability
  • create_attachmentno sensitive capability
  • create_boardno sensitive capability
  • create_checklistno sensitive capability
  • create_labelno sensitive capability
  • create_listno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
  • delete_attachmentno sensitive capability
  • delete_boardno sensitive capability
  • delete_cardno sensitive capability
  • delete_check_itemno sensitive capability
  • delete_checklistno sensitive capability
  • delete_commentno sensitive capability
  • delete_labelno sensitive capability
  • get_attachmentno sensitive capability
  • get_boardno sensitive capability
  • get_board_overviewno sensitive capability
  • get_cardno sensitive capability
  • get_meno sensitive capability
  • get_memberno sensitive capability
  • get_webhookno sensitive capability
  • list_attachmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_board_labelsno sensitive capability
  • list_board_membersno sensitive capability
  • list_boardsno sensitive capability
  • list_card_checklistsno sensitive capability
  • list_cardsno sensitive capability
  • list_check_itemsno sensitive capability
  • list_commentsno sensitive capability
  • list_listsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • remove_label_from_cardno sensitive capability
  • update_commentno sensitive capability
  • upload_attachmentno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.14.1 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25
v0.14.0 A 96/100 1 1.12.1 2026-07-27

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan trellio-mcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

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