Tradingview Mcp Thaqif MCP Server
tradingview-mcp-thaqif
npm
v2.0.1
Published by tz24cloud — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server bridging TradingView Desktop (via Chrome DevTools Protocol) for Pine Script v5/v6 development, FCPO/futures analysis, and Wyckoff multi-timeframe workflows. Improved MIT fork with an expanded rules engine.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/health.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/health.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; export async function healthCheck() { await getClient(); const target =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/health.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/connection.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/connection.js:72`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const resp = await fetch(`http://${CDP_HOST}:${CDP_PORT}/json/list`); const targets = await resp.json(); // P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/connection.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/alerts.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/core/alerts.js:78`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: it evaluateAsync(` fetch('https://pricealerts.tradingview.com/list_alerts', { credentials: 'include' }) .the
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/alerts.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/chart.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/core/chart.js:209`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch(`https://symbol-search.tradingview.com/symbol_search/v3/?${params}`, { headers: { 'Or
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/chart.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/pine.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/core/pine.js:190`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch( 'https://pine-facade.tradingview.com/pine-facade/translate_light?user_name=Guest&pin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/pine.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/core/tab.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/core/tab.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const resp = await fetch(`http://${CDP_HOST}:${CDP_PORT}/json/list`); const targets = await resp.json(); co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/tab.js
Tools 81
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
alert_createno sensitive capabilityalert_deleteno sensitive capabilityalert_listno sensitive capabilitybatch_runno sensitive capabilitycapture_screenshotno sensitive capabilitychart_get_stateno sensitive capabilitychart_get_visible_rangeno sensitive capabilitychart_manage_indicatorno sensitive capabilitychart_scroll_to_dateno sensitive capabilitychart_set_symbolno sensitive capability
Show 71 more tools ↓
chart_set_timeframeno sensitive capabilitychart_set_typeno sensitive capabilitychart_set_visible_rangeno sensitive capabilitydata_get_equityno sensitive capabilitydata_get_indicatorno sensitive capabilitydata_get_ohlcvno sensitive capabilitydata_get_pine_boxesno sensitive capabilitydata_get_pine_labelsno sensitive capabilitydata_get_pine_linesno sensitive capabilitydata_get_pine_tablesno sensitive capabilitydata_get_strategy_resultsno sensitive capabilitydata_get_study_valuesno sensitive capabilitydata_get_tradesno sensitive capabilitydepth_getno sensitive capabilitydraw_clearno sensitive capabilitydraw_get_propertiesno sensitive capabilitydraw_listno sensitive capabilitydraw_remove_oneno sensitive capabilitydraw_shapeno sensitive capabilityindicator_set_inputsno sensitive capabilityindicator_toggle_visibilityno sensitive capabilitylayout_listno sensitive capabilitylayout_switchno sensitive capabilitymorning_briefno sensitive capabilitypane_focusno sensitive capabilitypane_listno sensitive capabilitypane_set_layoutno sensitive capabilitypane_set_symbolno sensitive capabilitypine_analyzeno sensitive capabilitypine_checkno sensitive capabilitypine_compileno sensitive capabilitypine_get_consoleno sensitive capabilitypine_get_errorsno sensitive capabilitypine_get_sourceno sensitive capabilitypine_list_scriptsno sensitive capabilitypine_newno sensitive capabilitypine_openno sensitive capabilitypine_saveno sensitive capabilitypine_set_sourceno sensitive capabilitypine_smart_compileno sensitive capabilityquote_getno sensitive capabilityreplay_autoplayno sensitive capabilityreplay_startno sensitive capabilityreplay_statusno sensitive capabilityreplay_stepno sensitive capabilityreplay_stopno sensitive capabilityreplay_tradeno sensitive capabilitysession_getno sensitive capabilitysession_saveno sensitive capabilitysymbol_infono sensitive capabilitysymbol_searchno sensitive capabilitytab_closeno sensitive capabilitytab_listno sensitive capabilitytab_newno sensitive capabilitytab_switchno sensitive capabilitytv_discoverno sensitive capabilitytv_health_checkno sensitive capabilitytv_launchno sensitive capabilitytv_ui_stateno sensitive capabilityui_clickno sensitive capabilityui_evaluateno sensitive capabilityui_find_elementno sensitive capabilityui_fullscreenno sensitive capabilityui_hoverno sensitive capabilityui_keyboardno sensitive capabilityui_mouse_clickno sensitive capabilityui_open_panelno sensitive capabilityui_scrollno sensitive capabilityui_type_textno sensitive capabilitywatchlist_addno sensitive capabilitywatchlist_getno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (81 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan tradingview-mcp-thaqif --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.