trading-skills
PyPI
v0.18.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
AI-powered market analysis skills and MCP server for stock and options traders
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_earnings_calendar.py:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: list(args) result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if result.returncode != 0: raise
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_earnings_calendar.py
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_markdown_to_pdf.py:353`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self): result = subprocess.run( ["uv", "run", "python", str(SCRIPT)], capture_output=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_markdown_to_pdf.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
earnings_calendarno sensitive capabilityfundamentalsno sensitive capabilityget_versionno sensitive capabilityib_0dte_ema_vixno sensitive capabilityib_accountno sensitive capabilityib_collarno sensitive capabilityib_delta_exposureno sensitive capabilityib_find_short_rollno sensitive capabilityib_option_chainno sensitive capabilityib_option_expiriesno sensitive capabilityib_pmcc_advisorno sensitive capabilityib_portfoliono sensitive capabilityib_portfolio_action_reportno sensitive capabilityib_stop_lossno sensitive capabilityib_trades_historyno sensitive capabilityib_trailing_stopno sensitive capabilityinsider_tradingno sensitive capabilitynews_sentimentno sensitive capabilityoption_chainno sensitive capabilityoption_expiriesno sensitive capabilityoption_greeksno sensitive capabilitypiotroski_scoreno sensitive capabilityprice_correlationno sensitive capabilityprice_historyno sensitive capabilityreport_stockno sensitive capabilityrisk_assessmentno sensitive capabilityscan_bullishno sensitive capabilityscan_pmccno sensitive capabilityspread_diagonalno sensitive capabilityspread_iron_condorno sensitive capabilityspread_straddleno sensitive capabilityspread_strangleno sensitive capabilityspread_verticalno sensitive capabilitystock_quoteno sensitive capabilitytechnical_indicatorsno sensitive capabilitywhale_huntingno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.18.1 latest |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.14.0 | 2026-09-20 |
v0.16.0 |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan trading-skills --online --registry pypi
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