Tracepulse MCP Server
tracepulse
npm
v0.9.31
Published by sourjya — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Runtime feedback MCP server for AI coding agents. ViewGraph sees the UI - TracePulse feels the backend.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Tool "verify_build" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "verify_build" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool verify_build
high Tool "run_and_watch" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_and_watch" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_and_watch
high Tool "verify_mcp" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "verify_mcp" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool verify_mcp
high Tool "start_server" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "start_server" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool start_server
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2099`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { createInterface } from "readline"; import { resolve } from "path"; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/init-command-V6O4TMLD.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/init-command-V6O4TMLD.js:101`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://registry.npmjs.org/tracepulse/latest", { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3e3)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/init-command-V6O4TMLD.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "typecheck_command" on "verify_build"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "verify_build" takes a command-shaped parameter "typecheck_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool verify_build · inputSchema.properties.typecheck_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "build_command" on "verify_build"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "verify_build" takes a command-shaped parameter "build_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool verify_build · inputSchema.properties.build_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_and_watch"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_and_watch" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_and_watch · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "verify_mcp"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "verify_mcp" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool verify_mcp · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "start_server"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "start_server" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool start_server · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "verify_build" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "verify_build" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool verify_build
low Mutating tool "run_and_watch" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_and_watch" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_and_watch
low Mutating tool "verify_mcp" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "verify_mcp" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool verify_mcp
low Mutating tool "start_server" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "start_server" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool start_server
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
run_and_watchruns code / shellstart_serverruns code / shellverify_buildruns code / shellverify_mcpruns code / shellacknowledge_errorno sensitive capabilitycheck_driftno sensitive capabilitycheck_portno sensitive capabilityclear_errorsno sensitive capabilitycorrelate_with_diffno sensitive capabilityfree_portno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
get_audit_trailno sensitive capabilityget_bug_patternsno sensitive capabilityget_build_errorsno sensitive capabilityget_correlated_errorsno sensitive capabilityget_cross_layer_diagnosisno sensitive capabilityget_error_clustersno sensitive capabilityget_error_contextno sensitive capabilityget_error_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_errorsno sensitive capabilityget_health_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_infra_detailno sensitive capabilityget_infra_statusno sensitive capabilityget_migration_statusno sensitive capabilityget_new_errorsno sensitive capabilityget_perf_baselineno sensitive capabilityget_project_healthno sensitive capabilityget_prompt_contextno sensitive capabilityget_requestsno sensitive capabilityget_runtime_statusno sensitive capabilityget_server_logsno sensitive capabilityget_session_impactno sensitive capabilityget_session_insightsno sensitive capabilityget_session_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_timelineno sensitive capabilitylist_probesno sensitive capabilitylist_servicesno sensitive capabilityregister_probeno sensitive capabilityrestart_serverno sensitive capabilitystop_serverno sensitive capabilityverify_fixno sensitive capabilityverify_loopno sensitive capabilitywait_for_buildno sensitive capabilitywait_for_eventno sensitive capabilitywatch_for_errorsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.31 latest |
A 93/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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