Trace — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "trace-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "trace-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "trace-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 93,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/extract-worker.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/extract-worker.js:12356`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/extract-worker.js"
},
"evidence": "json\", // SSH keys \"id_rsa\", \"id_rsa.*\", \"id_ed25519\", \"id_ed25519.*\", \"id_dsa\", \"id_ecdsa\", // Auth / c",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/extract-worker.js",
"line": 12356,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/proxy.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxy.js:26541`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxy.js"
},
"evidence": "FileSync, spawn } from \"child_process\"; import fs11 from \"fs\"; import { constants as osConstants } from \"os\"; import pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/proxy.js",
"line": 26541,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/proxy.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxy.js:26688`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxy.js"
},
"evidence": "try { const out = execSync(`launchctl list ${PLIST_LABEL} 2>&1`, { encoding: \"utf-8\" }); return !out.includes(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/proxy.js",
"line": 26688,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/proxy.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/proxy.js:7486`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/proxy.js"
},
"evidence": "; return (await import(href)).default; } catch (error48) { try { return (0, exports.load",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/proxy.js",
"line": 7486,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/ga4-snapshot.mjs)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/ga4-snapshot.mjs:89`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/ga4-snapshot.mjs"
},
"evidence": "('base64url'); return fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "scripts/ga4-snapshot.mjs",
"line": 89,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjs)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjs:63`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjs"
},
"evidence": "{ const res = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/releases?per_page=10`, { headers: { 'User-Agen",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "scripts/verify-upgrade-path.mjs",
"line": 63,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bench-index-throughput.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bench-index-throughput.ts:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/bench-index-throughput.ts"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/bench-index-throughput.ts",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bench-name-tokens.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bench-name-tokens.ts:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/bench-name-tokens.ts"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; i",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/bench-name-tokens.ts",
"line": 26,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bench-pr-context.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bench-pr-context.ts:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/bench-pr-context.ts"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/bench-pr-context.ts",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bench-pr-quality.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bench-pr-quality.ts:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/bench-pr-quality.ts"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/bench-pr-quality.ts",
"line": 28,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bench-response-tokens.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bench-response-tokens.ts:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/bench-response-tokens.ts"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { fileURLToPath, p",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/bench-response-tokens.ts",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bench-session-scaling.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bench-session-scaling.ts:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/bench-session-scaling.ts"
},
"evidence": "ildProcess } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/bench-session-scaling.ts",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bench-toon.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bench-toon.ts:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/bench-toon.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/bench-toon.ts",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/calibrate-health-metrics.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/calibrate-health-metrics.mjs:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/calibrate-health-metrics.mjs"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; const FIX_PATTERN = /\\b(fix|bug|patch|hotfix|repair|resolve|correct)\\b/i; const",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/calibrate-health-metrics.mjs",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/capture-screenshots.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/capture-screenshots.mjs:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/capture-screenshots.mjs"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import os fr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/capture-screenshots.mjs",
"line": 56,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bench-name-tokens.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bench-name-tokens.ts:49`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/bench-name-tokens.ts"
},
"evidence": "rd<string, unknown>> => import(spec); { const o200k = await import('gpt-tokenizer/encoding/o200k_base'); tokenizers",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "scripts/bench-name-tokens.ts",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"trace-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "trace-mcp"
},
"evidence": "node scripts/preflight-native.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-app.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-control-plane.mjs",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "959efbbc8bedbd6173857009ed4e916399fddded181098d4838a561b71fbc21d",
"stats": {
"tools": 1,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 2,
"low": 13,
"info": 0
}
}
}