Toolhive MCP Server
toolhive-mcp
npm
v0.2.2
Published by toolhive — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A ToolHive MCP server for managing MCP servers through natural language
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/toolhive-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/toolhive-mcp.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs-extra'); const path = require('path'); const chalk = req
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/toolhive-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/index.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); /** * Start the ToolHive MCP server * @param {Object} options - Configuratio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/toolhive_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/toolhive_server.py:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _api_server_process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=stdout_log, stderr=stderr_log,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/toolhive_server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bin/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bin/setup.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Get the directory where this package is insta
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/setup.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"toolhive-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node bin/setup.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package toolhive-mcp
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_server_logsreads sensitive dataadd_registryno sensitive capabilityget_client_discoveryno sensitive capabilityget_openapi_specno sensitive capabilityget_registry_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_server_requirementsno sensitive capabilityget_toolhive_statusno sensitive capabilityget_toolhive_versionno sensitive capabilitylist_registriesno sensitive capabilitylist_registry_serversno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
list_running_serversno sensitive capabilityremove_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilityremove_registryno sensitive capabilityrestart_api_serverno sensitive capabilityrestart_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilityrun_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilitysearch_internet_for_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilitysearch_registry_serversno sensitive capabilitystop_mcp_serverno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.2 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan toolhive-mcp --onlineMore in Cloud & DevOps
Operator control CLI for AdGuard Home with an MCP adapter
interacting with Aliyun (Alibaba Cloud) services through This MCP server provides tools.
MCP server for the Aspro.Cloud REST API
MCP server for Atlassian Confluence and Jira Cloud APIs
AuroraCloud-first MCP server that exposes AuroraDocs workspace data to Claude Desktop and other AI agents
The official AWS Knowledge Base retrieval server using Bedrock Agent Runtime.