Tokesave MCP Server
tokesave-mcp
npm
v1.0.5
Published by irsyadmr354 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The ultimate AI token-saving MCP middleware — compression, caching, injection shield, multi-server routing, and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/proxy.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/proxy.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { Transform } = require('stream'); const compressor = require('./compress
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/proxy.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/repo_audit.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/repo_audit.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const BINARY_EXTS = ne
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/repo_audit.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/repo_cleanup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/repo_cleanup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const COMMON_GITIGNORE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/repo_cleanup.js
low Unconstrained path parameter "filePath" on "read_file_range"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_file_range" takes a path parameter "filePath" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_file_range · inputSchema.properties.filePath
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_statsreads sensitive dataread_file_rangereads sensitive datarepo_cleanupreads sensitive dataauto_setupno sensitive capabilitybenchmarkno sensitive capabilitycheck_context_pressureno sensitive capabilitycompress_batchno sensitive capabilitycompress_fileno sensitive capabilitycompress_file_chunkedno sensitive capabilitycompress_outputno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
compress_textno sensitive capabilitycompress_urlno sensitive capabilitydiff_filesno sensitive capabilityfile_mtreeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_proxy_configno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilitygrep_filesno sensitive capabilityread_function_bodyno sensitive capabilityrecall_memoryno sensitive capabilityrepo_auditno sensitive capabilityrepo_cleanup_applyno sensitive capabilityscan_injectionno sensitive capabilityset_modeno sensitive capabilitysummarize_fileno sensitive capabilityswarm_assign_taskno sensitive capabilityswarm_create_agentno sensitive capabilityswarm_get_statusno sensitive capabilityTokeSave System Promptno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan tokesave-mcp --onlineMore in Files & Storage
Safe bulk Meta ads: launch 150+ campaigns from Drive folders with spend guardrails and validation.
CLI tool to add MCP servers to various AI coding clients
MCP compatibility adapter for Agent Tool Protocol
MCP server for multi-tenant DuckDB management with R2/S3 storage
A stdio-to-HTTP MCP proxy that transparently intercepts file parameters, reading local files and base64-encoding them before forwarding to the remote server.
Free buyer-side outcome verification and provider comparison for supplied agent receipts.