Token Optimizer (ooples) MCP Server
token-optimizer-mcp
npm
v2.17.0
Published by ooples — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Intelligent context window optimization for Claude Code - store content externally via caching and compression, freeing up your context window for what matters
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11.7 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11.7 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×4 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 7 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/code-analysis/smart-security.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/code-analysis/smart-security.js:152`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , name: 'Unsafe eval()', category: 'unsafe-eval', severity: 'critical', pattern: /\beval
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/code-analysis/smart-security.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-wrapper.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-wrapper.mjs:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirname, join } from 'path'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-wrapper.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-build.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-build.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-engine.js'; import { TokenCounter
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-build.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-docker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-docker.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-engine.js'; import { createHash }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-docker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-install.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-engine.js'; import { createHash }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-install.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-lint.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-lint.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-engine.js'; import { TokenCounter
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-lint.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-logs.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-logs.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-engine.js'; import { createHash }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-logs.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-network.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-network.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-engine.js'; import { createHash }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-network.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-processes.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-processes.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-processes.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-system-metrics.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-system-metrics.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-engine.js'; import { createHash }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-system-metrics.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/build-systems/smart-test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/build-systems/smart-test.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CacheEngine } from '../../core/cache-engine.js'; import { TokenCounter
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/build-systems/smart-test.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/file-operations/smart-branch.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/file-operations/smart-branch.js:330`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`git branch --merged ${target}`, { cwd, encoding: 'utf-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/file-operations/smart-branch.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/file-operations/smart-diff.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/file-operations/smart-diff.js:204`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry { return execSync(`git rev-parse ${ref}`, { cwd, encoding: 'utf-8',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/file-operations/smart-diff.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/file-operations/smart-log.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/file-operations/smart-log.js:343`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`git diff-tree --no-commit-id --name-only -r ${hash}`, { cwd,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/file-operations/smart-log.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/file-operations/smart-merge.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/file-operations/smart-merge.js:239`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry { return execSync(`git rev-parse ${ref}`, { cwd, encoding: 'utf-8',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/file-operations/smart-merge.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/tools/advanced-caching/smart-cache.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/advanced-caching/smart-cache.js:132`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: data = await this.import(options); break; default: throw n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/advanced-caching/smart-cache.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/tools/code-analysis/smart-imports.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/code-analysis/smart-imports.js:391`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dImports.length} unused import(s) from '${imp.module}': ${imp.unusedImports.join(', ')}`, suggestion
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/code-analysis/smart-imports.js
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_optimizationno sensitive capabilityanalyze_project_tokensno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilitycompress_textno sensitive capabilitycount_tokensno sensitive capabilitydecompress_textno sensitive capabilityget_cache_statsno sensitive capabilityget_cachedno sensitive capabilityget_session_statsno sensitive capabilityoptimize_sessionno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
optimize_textno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.17.0 latest |
B 81/100 | 17 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan token-optimizer-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Token Optimizer 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
MCP server that cuts LLM token costs: accurate token counting, cost estimates across GPT/Claude/Gemini, rule-based prompt slimming with measured savings, and cheapest-model recommendations. Works with Claude, Cursor, and any MCP client.
High-performance MCP server for minimizing LLM token usage and API costs via structural code analysis and precision chunking
Intelligent context window optimization for Claude Code - store content externally via caching and compression, freeing up your context window for what matters
Orchestration + observability + coach layer for Claude Code token optimization. Measures tool usage, enforces budgets, advises on complementary tools (serena, RTK), and proactively surfaces savings tips.
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