Housecallpro MCP Server
@toducthanh/housecallpro-mcp
npm
v0.1.2
Published by @toducthanh — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server and skills for the Housecall Pro public API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_customers, list_employees, list_estimates, list_events, list_invoices, list_jobs, list_leads, list_materials, list_pricebook_services, list_tags]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook_subscription, delete_webhook_subscription]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_customers, list_employees, list_estimates, list_events, list_invoices, list_jobs, list_leads, list_materials, list_pricebook_services, list_tags
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_customers → create_webhook_subscription
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook_subscription"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook_subscription" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook_subscription · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 68
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhook_subscriptionnetwork egressdelete_webhook_subscriptionnetwork egresslist_customersingests untrusted inputlist_employeesingests untrusted inputlist_estimatesingests untrusted inputlist_eventsingests untrusted inputlist_invoicesingests untrusted inputlist_jobsingests untrusted inputlist_leadsingests untrusted inputlist_materialsingests untrusted input
Show 58 more tools ↓
list_pricebook_servicesingests untrusted inputlist_tagsingests untrusted inputadd_job_attachmentno sensitive capabilityadd_job_line_itemno sensitive capabilityadd_job_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_job_tagno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_job_input_materialsno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_job_line_itemsno sensitive capabilitycreate_customerno sensitive capabilitycreate_customer_addressno sensitive capabilitycreate_estimateno sensitive capabilitycreate_jobno sensitive capabilitycreate_job_linkno sensitive capabilitycreate_leadno sensitive capabilitycreate_materialno sensitive capabilitycreate_pricebook_serviceno sensitive capabilitycreate_tagno sensitive capabilitydelete_job_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_job_scheduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_materialno sensitive capabilitydelete_pricebook_serviceno sensitive capabilitydelete_tagno sensitive capabilitydisable_applicationno sensitive capabilitydispatch_jobno sensitive capabilityenable_applicationno sensitive capabilityget_applicationno sensitive capabilityget_companyno sensitive capabilityget_customerno sensitive capabilityget_customer_addressno sensitive capabilityget_estimateno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_jobno sensitive capabilityget_job_invoicesno sensitive capabilityget_leadno sensitive capabilityget_materialno sensitive capabilityget_pricebook_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_schedule_windowsno sensitive capabilitylist_checklistsno sensitive capabilitylist_customer_addressesno sensitive capabilitylist_job_appointmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_job_input_materialsno sensitive capabilitylist_job_line_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_job_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_lead_sourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_material_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_pipeline_statusesno sensitive capabilitylist_price_formsno sensitive capabilitylist_routesno sensitive capabilitylist_service_zonesno sensitive capabilitylock_jobno sensitive capabilitylock_jobs_by_time_rangeno sensitive capabilityremove_job_tagno sensitive capabilityupdate_customerno sensitive capabilityupdate_job_scheduleno sensitive capabilityupdate_materialno sensitive capabilityupdate_pipeline_statusno sensitive capabilityupdate_pricebook_serviceno sensitive capabilityupdate_tagno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (68 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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