Rosetta — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@tikoci/rosetta",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@tikoci/rosetta"
},
"server": {
"name": "@tikoci/rosetta"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"routeros_lookup_property\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_lookup_property\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_lookup_property"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"routeros_explain_command\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_explain_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_explain_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"routeros_command_version_check\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_command_version_check\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_command_version_check"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/rosetta.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/rosetta.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/rosetta.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import(\"node:child_process\"); const proc = spawn(\"bun\", [\"run\", entry, ...process.argv.slice(2)], { std",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/rosetta.js",
"line": 23,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([routeros_get_page, routeros_lookup_property, routeros_explain_command, routeros_command_tree, routeros_stats, routeros_search_changelogs, routeros_dude_search, routeros_dude_get_page, routeros_command_version_check, routeros_command_diff, routeros_current_versions]) co-exist with external-action tools ([routeros_lookup_property, routeros_explain_command, routeros_command_version_check]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "routeros_get_page → routeros_lookup_property"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [routeros_get_page, routeros_lookup_property, routeros_explain_command, routeros_command_tree, routeros_stats, routeros_search_changelogs, routeros_du",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"routeros_get_page",
"routeros_lookup_property",
"routeros_explain_command",
"routeros_command_tree",
"routeros_stats",
"routeros_search_changelogs",
"routeros_dude_search",
"routeros_dude_get_page",
"routeros_command_version_check",
"routeros_command_diff",
"routeros_current_versions"
],
"sinks": [
"routeros_lookup_property",
"routeros_explain_command",
"routeros_command_version_check"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/extract-changelogs.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/extract-changelogs.ts:162`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/extract-changelogs.ts"
},
"evidence": "const resp = await fetch(`https://upgrade.mikrotik.com/routeros/NEWESTa7.${channel}`); if (!resp.ok) {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/extract-changelogs.ts",
"line": 162,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command_path\" on \"routeros_lookup_property\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_lookup_property\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command_path\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_lookup_property",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command_path"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"routeros_explain_command\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_explain_command\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_explain_command",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command_path\" on \"routeros_command_version_check\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_command_version_check\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command_path\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_command_version_check",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command_path"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/rosetta.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/rosetta.js:18`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/rosetta.js"
},
"evidence": "entry directly await import(entry); } else { // Running under Node — try to delegate to Bun, but warn the user co",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "bin/rosetta.js",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"routeros_lookup_property\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_lookup_property\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_lookup_property"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"routeros_explain_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_explain_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_explain_command"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"routeros_command_version_check\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"routeros_command_version_check\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "routeros_command_version_check"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/release.test.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/release.test.ts:779`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/release.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "oContain(\"MCP retrieval eval (Phase 0)\"); expect(src).not.toContain(\"MCP retrieval eval (Phase 1, self-supervised, n",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/release.test.ts",
"line": 779,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/export.test.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/export.test.ts:506`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/export.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "tch(\", \"new Database\", \"child_process\", \"readFile(\", \"Bun.file(\", \"require(\"]) { expect(src).not.toContain(primiti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/export.test.ts",
"line": 506,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/release.test.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/release.test.ts:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/release.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "expect(src).toContain('spawn(\"bun\"'); }); }); // -------------------------------------------------------------------",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/release.test.ts",
"line": 98,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/setup.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/setup.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/setup.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { closeSync, existsSync, fstatSync, openSync, readdirSync, re",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/setup.ts",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"routeros_get_page",
"routeros_lookup_property",
"routeros_explain_command",
"routeros_command_tree",
"routeros_stats",
"routeros_search_changelogs",
"routeros_dude_search",
"routeros_dude_get_page",
"routeros_command_version_check",
"routeros_command_diff",
"routeros_current_versions"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"routeros_lookup_property",
"routeros_explain_command",
"routeros_command_version_check"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "routeros_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_get_page",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_lookup_property",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
],
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_explain_command",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
],
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_command_tree",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_stats",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_search_changelogs",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_dude_search",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_dude_get_page",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_command_version_check",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
],
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_command_diff",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_device_lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_search_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "routeros_current_versions",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "4b826a3b42470338fd7890af4e4b44a8cd9754db4b48c12f35cf4cbc61ec2b24",
"stats": {
"tools": 14,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 6,
"low": 7,
"info": 0
}
}
}