tijori-finance-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by lazzy0v0 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`setup.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import os from 'os'; const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_company_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_conglomerate_constituentsno sensitive capabilityget_financialsno sensitive capabilityget_fund_flowno sensitive capabilityget_knowledge_baseno sensitive capabilityget_macro_indicatorsno sensitive capabilityget_market_shareno sensitive capabilityget_marketsno sensitive capabilityget_operational_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_raw_materialsno sensitive capabilityget_revenue_mixno sensitive capabilityget_sector_constituentsno sensitive capabilityget_shareholdingno sensitive capabilitylist_popular_screensno sensitive capabilityresolve_company_idsno sensitive capabilityscreen_companiesno sensitive capabilitysearch_companyno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 99/100 | 1 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-27 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan tijori-finance-mcp --online
Security scan results for the 1money MCP server.
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Security scan results for the Actual MCP server.
Security scan results for the Actual Budget MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adyen MCP server.
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.