Thunder Eye — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "thunder-eye",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "thunder-eye"
},
"server": {
"name": "thunder-eye"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 79,
"threatScore": 86,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 14.18,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/capture/native.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/capture/native.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/capture/native.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { readFileSync, unlinkSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { tmpdir } from \"node",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/capture/native.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/detector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/detector.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/detector.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; export async function detectApps() { const platform = process.platform;",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/detector.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/inspect/native.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/inspect/native.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/inspect/native.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; export async function inspectNative(options) { const platform = process.plat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/inspect/native.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/window.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/window.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/window.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { detectApps } from \"./detector.js\"; export async function getWindowInfo(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/window.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/capture/native.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/capture/native.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/capture/native.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { readFileSync, unlinkSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { tmpdir } from \"node",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/capture/native.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/detector.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/detector.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/detector.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import type { DetectedApp } from \"./types.js\"; export async function detectApps",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/detector.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/inspect/native.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/inspect/native.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/inspect/native.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import type { InspectOptions } from \"../types.js\"; export async function inspec",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/inspect/native.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/window.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/window.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/window.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import type { WindowInfo } from \"./types.js\"; import { detectApps } from \"./dete",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/window.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/capture/native.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/capture/native.js:95`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/capture/native.js"
},
"evidence": "/g, '\\\\\"'); execSync(`osascript -e \"${escaped}\"`, { timeout: 3000 }); } catch {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/capture/native.js",
"line": 95,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/detector.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/detector.js:33`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/detector.js"
},
"evidence": "const result = execSync(`osascript -e ${escapeAppleScript(script)}`, { timeout: 15000,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/detector.js",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/inspect/native.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/inspect/native.js:44`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/inspect/native.js"
},
"evidence": "const result = execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command \"${script}\"`, { encoding: \"utf-8\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/inspect/native.js",
"line": 44,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/window.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/window.js:58`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/window.js"
},
"evidence": "const result = execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command \"${script}\"`, { timeout: 10000,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/window.js",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/capture/native.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/capture/native.ts:103`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/capture/native.ts"
},
"evidence": "ace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"'); execSync(`osascript -e \"${escaped}\"`, { timeout: 3000 }); } catch { // Window focus is",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/capture/native.ts",
"line": 103,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/detector.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/detector.ts:38`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/detector.ts"
},
"evidence": "l`; const result = execSync(`osascript -e ${escapeAppleScript(script)}`, { timeout: 15000, encoding: \"u",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/detector.ts",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/inspect/native.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/inspect/native.ts:51`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/inspect/native.ts"
},
"evidence": "`; const result = execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command \"${script}\"`, { encoding: \"utf-8\", timeout:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/inspect/native.ts",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/window.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/window.ts:69`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/window.ts"
},
"evidence": "`; const result = execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command \"${script}\"`, { timeout: 10000, encoding: \"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/window.ts",
"line": 69,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "detect_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_ui",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_window_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_windows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_element",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "e6d505ecf99fbfc9814822b6d8634dd2b67f047efd95368f019bb82e5f5c4cfc",
"stats": {
"tools": 6,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 8,
"medium": 8,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}