ThinkRun MCP Server
@thinkrun/mcp
npm
v0.3.14
Published by @thinkrun — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Connects AI coding agents to the user's real Chrome browser with real sessions and cookies so they can test their own frontend work.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "extract" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "extract" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool extract
high Tool "evaluate" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "evaluate" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool evaluate
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/onboarding.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/onboarding.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync, } from 'node:fs'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/onboarding.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([page_cache_html]) co-exist with external-action tools ([extract, evaluate]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [page_cache_html] → sinks [extract, evaluate]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow page_cache_html → extract
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "page_cache_html"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "page_cache_html" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool page_cache_html · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "extract"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "extract" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool extract · inputSchema.properties.script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "evaluate"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "evaluate" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool evaluate · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "extract" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "extract" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool extract
low Mutating tool "evaluate" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "evaluate" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool evaluate
Tools 67
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
evaluateruns code / shellextractruns code / shellpage_cache_htmlingests untrusted inputagent_identityno sensitive capabilitybrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_extractno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fillno sensitive capabilitybrowser_grant_statusno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_release_controlno sensitive capability
Show 57 more tools ↓
browser_request_controlno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_snapshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_type_textno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_textno sensitive capabilityclear_logsno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityclick_atno sensitive capabilityconsole_messagesno sensitive capabilityfillno sensitive capabilityfocusno sensitive capabilityget_dialogno sensitive capabilityget_htmlno sensitive capabilityget_titleno sensitive capabilityget_urlno sensitive capabilitygo_backno sensitive capabilitygo_forwardno sensitive capabilityhandle_dialogno sensitive capabilityhoverno sensitive capabilitylocal_action_cancelno sensitive capabilitylocal_action_runno sensitive capabilitylocal_action_statusno sensitive capabilitylocal_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilitylocal_reset_connectionno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilitynetwork_requestsno sensitive capabilitypage_cache_screenshotno sensitive capabilitypage_cache_textno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityrecording_uploadno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityselect_optionno sensitive capabilitysession_artifactsno sensitive capabilitysession_createno sensitive capabilitysession_deleteno sensitive capabilitysession_listno sensitive capabilitysession_releaseno sensitive capabilitysession_statusno sensitive capabilitysession_useno sensitive capabilitysession_wait_readyno sensitive capabilityset_auditingno sensitive capabilityset_modeno sensitive capabilitysleepno sensitive capabilitysnapshotno sensitive capabilitytab_attachno sensitive capabilitytab_closeno sensitive capabilitytab_listno sensitive capabilitytab_newno sensitive capabilitytab_switchno sensitive capabilitytask_createno sensitive capabilitytask_executeno sensitive capabilitytask_statusno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywait_for_elementno sensitive capabilitywait_for_textno sensitive capabilitywindow_newno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (67 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.14 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.3.13 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.3.12 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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