Things (npm) MCP Server
things-mcp-server
npm
v0.2.10
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for controlling Things on macOS
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/command-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/command-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { ALLOWED_COMMANDS, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../constants.js"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/command-runner.js
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
things_add_areano sensitive capabilitythings_add_projectno sensitive capabilitythings_add_tagno sensitive capabilitythings_add_todono sensitive capabilitythings_bulk_add_todosno sensitive capabilitythings_cancel_projectno sensitive capabilitythings_cancel_todono sensitive capabilitythings_complete_projectno sensitive capabilitythings_complete_todono sensitive capabilitythings_delete_areano sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
things_delete_projectno sensitive capabilitythings_delete_tagno sensitive capabilitythings_delete_todono sensitive capabilitythings_empty_trashno sensitive capabilitythings_get_areano sensitive capabilitythings_get_checklist_itemsno sensitive capabilitythings_get_projectno sensitive capabilitythings_get_selected_todosno sensitive capabilitythings_get_server_statusno sensitive capabilitythings_get_todono sensitive capabilitythings_list_area_itemsno sensitive capabilitythings_list_areasno sensitive capabilitythings_list_project_headingsno sensitive capabilitythings_list_project_todosno sensitive capabilitythings_list_project_todos_with_headingsno sensitive capabilitythings_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitythings_list_tag_todosno sensitive capabilitythings_list_tagsno sensitive capabilitythings_list_todosno sensitive capabilitythings_move_todono sensitive capabilitythings_open_searchno sensitive capabilitythings_search_projectsno sensitive capabilitythings_search_todosno sensitive capabilitythings_show_itemno sensitive capabilitythings_uncomplete_projectno sensitive capabilitythings_uncomplete_todono sensitive capabilitythings_update_areano sensitive capabilitythings_update_projectno sensitive capabilitythings_update_tagno sensitive capabilitythings_update_todono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.10 latest |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan things-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Things 7
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 8 side by side →
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