Thiagorufino Hub MCP Server
@thiagorufino/mcp-hub
npm
v1.0.9
Source verified
Published by thiagorufino1 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP Hub is a local web UI for testing LLMs and MCP servers. Connect providers, inspect tool calls, and run multi-turn chats in one place.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Dynamic code execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0q~1ve3._.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0q~1ve3._.js:4`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode.process(r,e));let s=Function(`${i.default.self}`,`${i.default.scope}`,r)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.value(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0q~1ve3._.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0unnweq._.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0unnweq._.js:4`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode.process(r,e));let s=Function(`${i.default.self}`,`${i.default.scope}`,r)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.value(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0unnweq._.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0q~1ve3._.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0q~1ve3._.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e,t,r)=>{t.exports=e.x("child_process",()=>require("child_process"))},2058,(e,t,r)=>{t.exports=s,s.sync=function(e,t){re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0q~1ve3._.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0unnweq._.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0unnweq._.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e,t,r)=>{t.exports=e.x("child_process",()=>require("child_process"))},2058,(e,t,r)=>{t.exports=s,s.sync=function(e,t){re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0unnweq._.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0m3693h._.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0m3693h._.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }),!0),this.lastIndex=0}exec(a){this.matcherRe.lastIndex=this.lastIndex;let b=this.matcherRe.exec(a);if(!b)return null;l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0m3693h._.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next-package/static/chunks/0bb5yst~a3ugd.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/static/chunks/0bb5yst~a3ugd.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }),!0),this.lastIndex=0}exec(e){this.matcherRe.lastIndex=this.lastIndex;let t=this.matcherRe.exec(e);if(!t)return null;l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/static/chunks/0bb5yst~a3ugd.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/mcp-portal.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/mcp-portal.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { createServer } from "net"; import { di
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/mcp-portal.mjs
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0-gr0wl._.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0-gr0wl._.js:1`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (d)return d;let e=await fetch("https://vercel.com/.well-known/openid-configuration",{headers:{"user-agent":p}});if(!e.ok
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0-gr0wl._.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0r2-zvg._.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0r2-zvg._.js:1`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (d)return d;let e=await fetch("https://vercel.com/.well-known/openid-configuration",{headers:{"user-agent":p}});if(!e.ok
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0r2-zvg._.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js:601`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { raw = await import(id); } catch (err) { // TODO(alexkirsz) This can happen when a client-side mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/ssr/[turbopack]_runtime.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/ssr/[turbopack]_runtime.js:601`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { raw = await import(id); } catch (err) { // TODO(alexkirsz) This can happen when a client-side mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .next/standalone/.next-package/server/chunks/ssr/[turbopack]_runtime.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.9 latest |
A 94/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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