Thetacog MCP Server
thetacog-mcp
npm
v2.53.0
Published by wiber — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Geometric-Driven Development (GDD) toolkit: cognitive rooms + Shadow Agent hooks + Ghost-Read pipeline (6 routes, persona-monologue) + thetacog-iterate convergence loop (meta-rule-checker, auto-applies high-confidence rewrites, adaptive stall-softening) +
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 13.5 = 87. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −12.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×5 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 87 − 7 = 80. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 22
high Shell/command execution in server code (dashboard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dashboard.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import Database from 'better-sqlite3'; const PORT = parseInt(process.env.THETAC
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dashboard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (gmail-sync.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`gmail-sync.js:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; const REPO = (() => { try { return execSync('git rev-parse --show-toplevel',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server gmail-sync.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/pmu-inspect.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/pmu-inspect.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; const REPO_ROOT = process.cwd(); const STATE_PATH = resolve(REPO_ROOT, 'data/pm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/pmu-inspect.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (next-engine.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`next-engine.mjs:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { homedir } from 'node:os'; import { join, dirname } from 'node:path'; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server next-engine.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (overview.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`overview.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; // HTML basename -> room key (matches .thetacog/gemini-sessions.json keys) cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server overview.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (gmail-sync.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`gmail-sync.js:102`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { const res = await fetch(`https://gmail.googleapis.com/gmail/v1/users/me/${pathname}`, { headers: { Authorizati
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server gmail-sync.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (gmail-sync.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`gmail-sync.js:120`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onsent + '\n'); try { execSync(`open '${consent}'`); } catch { /* headless — paste by hand */ } const code = await n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server gmail-sync.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (next-engine.mjs)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`next-engine.mjs:54`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { const out = execSync( `git -c core.quotepath=false log --since='${days} days ago' --pretty=format:'%h%
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server next-engine.mjs
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (overview.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`overview.js:266`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lList]; const raw = execSync( `git -C "${repoRoot}" log ${args.map(a => `"${a}"`).join(' ')}`, { encodin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server overview.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (server.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`server.js:213`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: hooks.sh'); try { execSync(`bash ${JSON.stringify(installer)} --pre-push`, { stdio: 'inherit' }); } catch (e) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/lib/pmu/cache-witness.mjs)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/pmu/cache-witness.mjs:76`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { out = JSON.parse(execSync(`"${PMU_BIN}" --sense`, { input: JSON.stringify({ claims: [doc], targets: _target
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/pmu/cache-witness.mjs
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/pmu/big-map-axes.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/pmu/big-map-axes.mjs:60`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const r = await fetch(`https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${m[1]}/HEAD/axes/${x}/${y}/${z}.dump.json`); i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/pmu/big-map-axes.mjs
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/pmu/map-crawl.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/pmu/map-crawl.mjs:17`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: => { const r = await fetch('https://api.github.com' + path, { headers: { accept: 'application/vnd.github+json' } });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/pmu/map-crawl.mjs
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/pmu/verify-peer.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/pmu/verify-peer.mjs:29`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e) => { const r = await fetch(`https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${repo}/HEAD/${file}`); return r.ok ? r.text() : null;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/pmu/verify-peer.mjs
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/rewrite/cli.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/rewrite/cli.mjs:123`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { const r = await fetch(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/sendPhoto`, { method: 'POST', body: form }); con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/rewrite/cli.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`postinstall.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = path.dirna
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server postinstall.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/bundle-pmu.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/bundle-pmu.mjs:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'; const PKG = resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/bundle-pmu.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/mesh/mesh-up.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/mesh/mesh-up.mjs:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import path from 'node:path'; const H
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/mesh/mesh-up.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/pmu-demo.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/pmu-demo.mjs:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { compress } from '../lib/pmu/compress.mjs'; import { openPrimer } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/pmu-demo.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/pmu-report.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/pmu-report.mjs:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { compress } from '../lib/pmu/compress.mjs'; const __dirname = dirname(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/pmu-report.mjs
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/pmu/panel-door.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/pmu/panel-door.mjs:97`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ncircledPanel } = await import(RENDERER)); } catch (e) { return { png: null, dataUri: null, meta: null, regions: [
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/pmu/panel-door.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"thetacog-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package thetacog-mcp
Tools 14
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
thetacog-streamnetwork egresspmu_verifyno sensitive capabilityread_tape_receiptno sensitive capabilitythetacog_overviewno sensitive capabilitythetacog-detectno sensitive capabilitythetacog-exportno sensitive capabilitythetacog-nextno sensitive capabilitythetacog-openno sensitive capabilitythetacog-pmu-inspectno sensitive capabilitythetacog-statusno sensitive capability
Show 4 more tools ↓
thetacog-switchno sensitive capabilitythetacog-terminalno sensitive capabilitythetacog-todono sensitive capabilitywrite_tape_intentno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.53.0 latest |
B 80/100 | 22 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.51.0 |
B 80/100 | 21 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v2.48.0 |
B 80/100 | 18 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.44.0 |
B 80/100 | 17 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.38.0 |
B 80/100 | 17 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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