Enhanced Homeassistant MCP Server
@thelord/enhanced-homeassistant-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by @thelord — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Enhanced MCP server for Home Assistant with comprehensive API integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Tool "homeassistant_run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "homeassistant_run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool homeassistant_run_script
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirname, join } from 'path'; const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
low Mutating tool "homeassistant_run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "homeassistant_run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool homeassistant_run_script
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@thelord/enhanced-homeassistant-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: npm run build
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @thelord/enhanced-homeassistant-mcp
Tools 50
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
homeassistant_run_scriptruns code / shellhomeassistant_send_notificationnetwork egresshomeassistant_activate_sceneno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_apino sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_api_statusno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_bulk_operationsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_call_serviceno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_check_configno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_control_climateno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_control_coversno sensitive capability
Show 40 more tools ↓
homeassistant_control_lightsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_control_media_playerno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_domain_summaryno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_entity_actionno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_favorite_actionsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_devices_by_typeno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_entity_historyno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_entity_stateno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_error_logno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_eventsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_logbookno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_resourceno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_stateno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_statisticsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_get_versionno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_addonsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_areasno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_automationsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_devicesno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_entitiesno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_input_booleansno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_integrationsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_resourcesno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_scenesno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_list_scriptsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_manage_favoritesno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_pingno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_reload_automationsno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_render_templateno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_restartno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_restart_serviceno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_search_entitiesno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_supervisor_infono sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_system_healthno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_system_infono sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_system_overviewno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_toggle_automationno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_toggle_input_booleanno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_trigger_automationno sensitive capabilityhomeassistant_validate_configno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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