Redmine — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@thelabnyc/redmine-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@thelabnyc/redmine-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@thelabnyc/redmine-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([get-attachment, download-attachment, get-issue, get-issue-relation, list-my-issues, get-time-entry]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create-issue, create-issue-relation]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get-attachment → create-issue"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [get-attachment, download-attachment, get-issue, get-issue-relation, list-my-issues, get-time-entry] → sinks [create-issue, create-issue-relation]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get-attachment",
"download-attachment",
"get-issue",
"get-issue-relation",
"list-my-issues",
"get-time-entry"
],
"sinks": [
"create-issue",
"create-issue-relation"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get-attachment",
"download-attachment",
"get-issue",
"get-issue-relation",
"list-my-issues",
"get-time-entry"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"create-issue",
"create-issue-relation"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get-attachment",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "attach-file-to-issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "download-attachment",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update-attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete-attachment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create-issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get-issue",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list-issue-relations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-issue-relation",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create-issue-relation",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete-issue-relation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-issue-priorities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-issue-statuses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-my-issues",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list-project-custom-fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-project-issue-categories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-project-members",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-project-versions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-queries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-trackers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search-redmine",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-time-entries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-time-entry",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create-time-entry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update-time-entry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete-time-entry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-time-entry-activities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update-issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add-issue-watcher",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove-issue-watcher",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "04fbd9a4c9968b42e1019138996aeb2f9486699783098459a9b66a75a1716f5d",
"stats": {
"tools": 33,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}