Agent Shadow Brain MCP Server
@theihtisham/agent-shadow-brain
npm
v6.3.0
Published by @theihtisham — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local-first memory and coordination layer for AI coding agents. Shadow Brain stores source-backed project lessons, recalls them across Codex, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, OpenCode, and other tools, generates resume briefings, audits memory quality, exports
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 21
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/brain/agent-firewall.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/agent-firewall.js:2`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: /(^|[/\\])(\.env(\.|$)|id_rsa|id_ed25519|\.npmrc|\.pypirc|\.netrc|credentials|secrets?)([/\\]|$)/i; const DESTRUCTIVE_C
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/agent-firewall.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/brain/config-drift-detector.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/config-drift-detector.js:15`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d: false }, { path: '.npmrc', required: false }, { path: '.nvmrc', required: false }, { path: 'docker-compos
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/config-drift-detector.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/brain/analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/analyzer.js:108`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: content: 'eval() or new Function() detected. These allow arbitrary code execution and are a major security risk. Use
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/analyzer.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/brain/context-completion.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/context-completion.js:694`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: avoid.push('use of eval() — security and performance risk'); } if (varCount > fileCount * 0.2) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/context-completion.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/brain/learning-engine.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/learning-engine.js:585`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lesson: `Avoid eval() in ${relPath} — it introduces code injection risks`, pattern: `eval:${ext
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/learning-engine.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/brain/lsp-server.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/lsp-server.js:346`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: gth, 1, 'SB001', 'Avoid eval() — potential code injection vulnerability')); } if (/innerHTML\s*=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/lsp-server.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/brain/security-audit.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/security-audit.js:148`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: description: 'Use of eval() or Function constructor — potential code injection', recommendation: 'Never use e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/security-audit.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/brain/smart-fix.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/smart-fix.js:30`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: issue: 'Dangerous eval() usage', transform: (code, m) => ({ before: m[0], after: `
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/smart-fix.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/aider.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/aider.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { BaseAdapter } from './base-adapter.js'; export class AiderAdapter exten
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adapters/aider.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/claude-code.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/claude-code.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { BaseAdapter } from './base-adapter.js'; export class ClaudeCodeAdapter
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adapters/claude-code.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/codex.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/codex.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { BaseAdapter } from './base-adapter.js'; export class CodexAdapter exten
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adapters/codex.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/opencode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/opencode.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { BaseAdapter } from './base-adapter.js'; export class OpenCodeAdapter ex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adapters/opencode.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/brain/code-age-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/code-age-analyzer.js:92`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const output = execSync(`git log --format="%an" --follow -- "${path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/code-age-analyzer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/brain/team-mode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/team-mode.js:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const gitUser = execSync('git config user.name', {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/team-mode.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/brain/vuln-scanner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/vuln-scanner.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) import { exec } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; export class VulnScanner
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/vuln-scanner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:179`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); const openCmd = process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'open' : process.pl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/brain/model-registry.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/model-registry.js:358`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/models', { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/model-registry.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/brain/code-age-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/code-age-analyzer.js:93`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`git log --format="%an" --follow -- "${path.relative(this.projectDir, filePath)}"`, { c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/code-age-analyzer.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/brain/brain-notebook.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/brain-notebook.js:338`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { return await import(spec).catch(() => null); } catch { return null; } } function starterC
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/brain-notebook.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/brain/brain-reflex.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/brain/brain-reflex.js:351`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { return await import(spec).catch(() => null); } catch { return null; } } let _instance = n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/brain/brain-reflex.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@theihtisham/agent-shadow-brain" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node dist/brain/auto-setup.js 2>>~/.shadow-brain/install.log || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @theihtisham/agent-shadow-brain
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v6.3.0 latest |
B 86/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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