Totem MCP Server
@thebriangao/totem
npm
v1.4.4
Published by @thebriangao — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Totem — talk to your wearables with AI over MCP. Today: full Whoop access via its private iOS API (48 tools, read + write, zod-validated outputs, auto-refresh Cognito auth). Fitbit, Apple Watch, and Garmin adapters in progress.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { dirname, resolve }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/ui.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/ui.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises"; import { randomBytes }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/ui.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/index.ts:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: awnOptions } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { dirname, resolve }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/index.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/ui.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/ui.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: awnOptions } from "node:child_process"; import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises"; import { randomBytes }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/ui.ts
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.js:254`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const r = await fetch("https://api.prod.whoop.com/users-service/v2/bootstrap?apiVersion=7", { header
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (src/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.ts:227`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { const r = await fetch("https://api.prod.whoop.com/users-service/v2/bootstrap?apiVersion=7", { headers: { a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises"; import { resolve } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.ts:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises"; import { resolve } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scripts/cognito_bootstrap.ts
Tools 48
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
whoop_activity_createno sensitive capabilitywhoop_activity_deleteno sensitive capabilitywhoop_behavior_impactno sensitive capabilitywhoop_calendarno sensitive capabilitywhoop_coach_askno sensitive capabilitywhoop_communitiesno sensitive capabilitywhoop_compareno sensitive capabilitywhoop_cycleno sensitive capabilitywhoop_cycle_logno sensitive capabilitywhoop_dayno sensitive capability
Show 38 more tools ↓
whoop_endpointsno sensitive capabilitywhoop_hidden_metricno sensitive capabilitywhoop_hr_zonesno sensitive capabilitywhoop_hr_zones_setno sensitive capabilitywhoop_journalno sensitive capabilitywhoop_journal_autopopno sensitive capabilitywhoop_journal_catalogno sensitive capabilitywhoop_journal_logno sensitive capabilitywhoop_leaderboardno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_catalogno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_custom_exerciseno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_exerciseno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_historyno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_libraryno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_logno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_progressionno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_prsno sensitive capabilitywhoop_lift_template_saveno sensitive capabilitywhoop_live_hrno sensitive capabilitywhoop_live_stateno sensitive capabilitywhoop_live_stressno sensitive capabilitywhoop_performance_assessmentno sensitive capabilitywhoop_profileno sensitive capabilitywhoop_profile_updateno sensitive capabilitywhoop_rawno sensitive capabilitywhoop_recoveryno sensitive capabilitywhoop_sleepno sensitive capabilitywhoop_sleep_needno sensitive capabilitywhoop_smart_alarmno sensitive capabilitywhoop_smart_alarm_setno sensitive capabilitywhoop_sports_catalogno sensitive capabilitywhoop_strainno sensitive capabilitywhoop_stressno sensitive capabilitywhoop_symptom_logno sensitive capabilitywhoop_todayno sensitive capabilitywhoop_trendno sensitive capabilitywhoop_workoutno sensitive capabilitywhoop_workoutsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (48 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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