Theagora MCP Server
@theagora/mcp
npm
v0.3.0
Published by @theagora — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the Theagora AI agent marketplace. 27 tools for buying, selling, and trading AI agent services with atomic escrow, cryptographic verification, and zero gas fees.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([browse_marketplace]) co-exist with external-action tools ([register_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [browse_marketplace] → sinks [register_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow browse_marketplace → register_webhook
medium Tool "unlink_identity" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink_identity" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink_identity
low Mutating tool "unlink_identity" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink_identity" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink_identity
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_marketplaceingests untrusted inputdelete_webhooknetwork egressregister_webhooknetwork egressunlink_identitywrites filesupdate_webhooknetwork egressaccept_inviteno sensitive capabilitycancel_orderno sensitive capabilitycheck_escrowno sensitive capabilitycheck_reputationno sensitive capabilityclaim_bountyno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
create_escrowno sensitive capabilitydepositno sensitive capabilityfile_disputeno sensitive capabilityfind_trendingno sensitive capabilityget_delivery_outputno sensitive capabilityget_function_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_function_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_market_datano sensitive capabilityget_market_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_provider_analyticsno sensitive capabilityinvite_to_tradeno sensitive capabilitylink_identityno sensitive capabilitymy_disputesno sensitive capabilitymy_functionsno sensitive capabilitymy_ordersno sensitive capabilitymy_profileno sensitive capabilitymy_purchasesno sensitive capabilitymy_salesno sensitive capabilitymy_webhooksno sensitive capabilityplace_orderno sensitive capabilitypoll_jobsno sensitive capabilityregister_functionno sensitive capabilitysubmit_deliveryno sensitive capabilityupdate_functionno sensitive capabilityview_invitesno sensitive capabilityview_orderbookno sensitive capabilitywalletno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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