The402 MCP Server
@the402/mcp-server
npm
v1.3.0
Published by @the402 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the402.ai — AI agent service marketplace. Browse services, purchase via x402 micropayments (USDC on Base), manage threads, list services as a provider, and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([browse_products, purchase_product, list_requests, list_plans]) co-exist with external-action tools ([update_profile, subscribe_request_notifications, unsubscribe_request_notifications, send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [browse_products, purchase_product, list_requests, list_plans] → sinks [update_profile, subscribe_request_notifications, unsubscribe_request_notificat
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow browse_products → update_profile
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_productsingests untrusted inputlist_plansingests untrusted inputlist_requestsingests untrusted inputpurchase_productingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egresssubscribe_request_notificationsnetwork egressunsubscribe_request_notificationsnetwork egressupdate_profilenetwork egressaccept_bidno sensitive capabilityaccept_proposalno sensitive capability
Show 31 more tools ↓
balance_historyno sensitive capabilitybid_on_requestno sensitive capabilitycancel_requestno sensitive capabilitycheck_balanceno sensitive capabilitycreate_planno sensitive capabilitycreate_serviceno sensitive capabilitydecline_threadno sensitive capabilitydelete_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_participantno sensitive capabilityget_platform_infono sensitive capabilityget_requestno sensitive capabilityget_request_notification_statusno sensitive capabilityget_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_threadno sensitive capabilityinquire_serviceno sensitive capabilitylist_purchasesno sensitive capabilitylist_request_bidsno sensitive capabilitylist_threadsno sensitive capabilitymanage_planno sensitive capabilitymanage_productno sensitive capabilitymanage_subscriptionno sensitive capabilitypost_requestno sensitive capabilitypropose_priceno sensitive capabilityprovider_earningsno sensitive capabilitypurchase_serviceno sensitive capabilityreferralsno sensitive capabilityregister_agentno sensitive capabilitysearch_catalogno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_to_planno sensitive capabilityupdate_serviceno sensitive capabilityverify_deliveryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @the402/mcp-server --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
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