Tg MCP Server
tg-mcp
npm
v1.3.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Local MCP server for your Telegram personal account — channels, digests, messaging, folders and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 8 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/shared/device-model.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/device-model.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { NodePlatform } from "@mtcute/no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/shared/device-model.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/shared/device-model.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/device-model.js:20`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = normalizeDeviceModel(execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -Command ${JSON.stringify(script)}`, { encoding: "ut
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/shared/device-model.js
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
tg_send_messagenetwork egresstg_archive_chatsno sensitive capabilitytg_create_channelno sensitive capabilitytg_create_folderno sensitive capabilitytg_edit_folderno sensitive capabilitytg_get_dialogsno sensitive capabilitytg_get_foldersno sensitive capabilitytg_get_messagesno sensitive capabilitytg_get_post_commentsno sensitive capabilitytg_get_recent_from_channelsno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
tg_get_recent_from_folderno sensitive capabilitytg_get_similar_channelsno sensitive capabilitytg_join_channelno sensitive capabilitytg_leave_channelno sensitive capabilitytg_mute_chatsno sensitive capabilitytg_search_channelsno sensitive capabilitytg_search_in_folderno sensitive capabilitytg_search_messagesno sensitive capabilitytg_set_channel_titleno sensitive capabilitytg_unarchive_chatsno sensitive capabilitytg_unmute_chatsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
B 86/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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