TerraDev MCP Server

terradev-mcp npm v2.0.8

Published by theoddden — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

GPU infrastructure server with 192 tools covering the training lifecycle, inference deployment with cost guardrails, Ray cluster management, and vLLM lifecycle.

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 22

high Tool "train" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "train" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool train

high Tool "ray_submit_job" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ray_submit_job" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ray_submit_job

high Tool "ray_wide_ep_deploy" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ray_wide_ep_deploy" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ray_wide_ep_deploy

high Tool "ray_disagg_pd_deploy" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ray_disagg_pd_deploy" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ray_disagg_pd_deploy

high Tool "training_config_generate" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "training_config_generate" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool training_config_generate

high Tool "training_launch_distributed" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "training_launch_distributed" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool training_launch_distributed

high Shell/command execution in server code (terradev_mcp.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`terradev_mcp.py:78`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["terradev", "--version"], capture_output=True,

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server terradev_mcp.py

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([hf_list_models, hf_list_datasets]) co-exist with external-action tools ([train, ray_submit_job, ray_wide_ep_deploy, ray_disagg_pd_deploy, training_config_generate, training_launch_distributed]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [hf_list_models, hf_list_datasets] → sinks [train, ray_submit_job, ray_wide_ep_deploy, ray_disagg_pd_deploy, training_config_generate, training_launch

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow hf_list_models → train

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "train"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "train" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool train · inputSchema.properties.script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_args" on "train"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "train" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_args" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool train · inputSchema.properties.script_args

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "ray_submit_job"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "ray_submit_job" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool ray_submit_job · inputSchema.properties.script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "generate_script" on "ray_wide_ep_deploy"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "ray_wide_ep_deploy" takes a command-shaped parameter "generate_script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool ray_wide_ep_deploy · inputSchema.properties.generate_script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "generate_script" on "ray_disagg_pd_deploy"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "ray_disagg_pd_deploy" takes a command-shaped parameter "generate_script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool ray_disagg_pd_deploy · inputSchema.properties.generate_script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "training_config_generate"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "training_config_generate" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool training_config_generate · inputSchema.properties.script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_args" on "training_config_generate"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "training_config_generate" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_args" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool training_config_generate · inputSchema.properties.script_args

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "training_launch_distributed"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "training_launch_distributed" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool training_launch_distributed · inputSchema.properties.script

low Mutating tool "train" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "train" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool train

low Mutating tool "ray_submit_job" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "ray_submit_job" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool ray_submit_job

low Mutating tool "ray_wide_ep_deploy" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "ray_wide_ep_deploy" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool ray_wide_ep_deploy

low Mutating tool "ray_disagg_pd_deploy" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "ray_disagg_pd_deploy" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool ray_disagg_pd_deploy

low Mutating tool "training_config_generate" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "training_config_generate" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool training_config_generate

low Mutating tool "training_launch_distributed" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "training_launch_distributed" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool training_launch_distributed

Tools 192

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • hf_list_datasetsingests untrusted input
  • hf_list_modelsingests untrusted input
  • ray_disagg_pd_deployruns code / shell
  • ray_submit_jobruns code / shell
  • ray_wide_ep_deployruns code / shell
  • trainruns code / shell
  • training_config_generateruns code / shell
  • training_launch_distributedruns code / shell
  • active_contextno sensitive capability
  • analyticsno sensitive capability
Show 182 more tools ↓
  • checkpoint_deleteno sensitive capability
  • checkpoint_listno sensitive capability
  • checkpoint_promoteno sensitive capability
  • checkpoint_restoreno sensitive capability
  • checkpoint_saveno sensitive capability
  • configure_providerno sensitive capability
  • cost_analyzeno sensitive capability
  • cost_budget_optimizeno sensitive capability
  • cost_optimize_recommendno sensitive capability
  • cost_scaler_startno sensitive capability
  • cost_scaler_statusno sensitive capability
  • cost_simulateno sensitive capability
  • datadog_create_dashboardno sensitive capability
  • datadog_create_monitorsno sensitive capability
  • datadog_list_dashboardsno sensitive capability
  • datadog_list_monitorsno sensitive capability
  • datadog_metric_catalogno sensitive capability
  • datadog_push_metricsno sensitive capability
  • datadog_queryno sensitive capability
  • datadog_send_eventno sensitive capability
  • datadog_statusno sensitive capability
  • datadog_terraform_exportno sensitive capability
  • dvc_diffno sensitive capability
  • dvc_pushno sensitive capability
  • dvc_stage_checkpointno sensitive capability
  • dvc_statusno sensitive capability
  • egress_cheapest_routeno sensitive capability
  • egress_optimize_stagingno sensitive capability
  • gitops_bootstrapno sensitive capability
  • gitops_initno sensitive capability
  • gitops_syncno sensitive capability
  • gitops_validateno sensitive capability
  • governance_compliance_reportno sensitive capability
  • governance_evaluate_opano sensitive capability
  • governance_move_datano sensitive capability
  • governance_movement_historyno sensitive capability
  • governance_record_consentno sensitive capability
  • governance_request_consentno sensitive capability
  • gpu_topologyno sensitive capability
  • guardrails_chatno sensitive capability
  • guardrails_generate_configno sensitive capability
  • guardrails_k8sno sensitive capability
  • guardrails_testno sensitive capability
  • helm_generateno sensitive capability
  • hf_create_endpointno sensitive capability
  • hf_delete_endpointno sensitive capability
  • hf_endpoint_inferno sensitive capability
  • hf_endpoint_infono sensitive capability
  • hf_hardware_compareno sensitive capability
  • hf_hardware_recommendno sensitive capability
  • hf_list_endpointsno sensitive capability
  • hf_model_infono sensitive capability
  • hf_smart_templateno sensitive capability
  • hf_space_deployno sensitive capability
  • hf_space_statusno sensitive capability
  • infer_deployno sensitive capability
  • infer_failoverno sensitive capability
  • infer_routeno sensitive capability
  • infer_route_disaggno sensitive capability
  • infer_statusno sensitive capability
  • inferx_configureno sensitive capability
  • inferx_deleteno sensitive capability
  • inferx_deployno sensitive capability
  • inferx_listno sensitive capability
  • inferx_optimizeno sensitive capability
  • inferx_quoteno sensitive capability
  • inferx_statusno sensitive capability
  • inferx_usageno sensitive capability
  • k8s_createno sensitive capability
  • k8s_destroyno sensitive capability
  • k8s_device_pluginno sensitive capability
  • k8s_gpu_operator_installno sensitive capability
  • k8s_infono sensitive capability
  • k8s_listno sensitive capability
  • k8s_mig_configureno sensitive capability
  • k8s_monitoring_stackno sensitive capability
  • k8s_time_slicingno sensitive capability
  • kserve_generate_yamlno sensitive capability
  • kserve_listno sensitive capability
  • kserve_statusno sensitive capability
  • langchain_create_sglang_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • langchain_create_workflowno sensitive capability
  • langgraph_create_workflowno sensitive capability
  • langgraph_evaluation_workflowno sensitive capability
  • langgraph_orchestrator_workerno sensitive capability
  • langgraph_workflow_statusno sensitive capability
  • langsmith_create_projectno sensitive capability
  • langsmith_create_traceno sensitive capability
  • langsmith_get_workspacesno sensitive capability
  • langsmith_gpu_correlateno sensitive capability
  • langsmith_list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • langsmith_list_runsno sensitive capability
  • local_scanno sensitive capability
  • lora_addno sensitive capability
  • lora_listno sensitive capability
  • lora_removeno sensitive capability
  • manage_instanceno sensitive capability
  • manifestsno sensitive capability
  • mlflow_list_experimentsno sensitive capability
  • mlflow_log_runno sensitive capability
  • mlflow_register_modelno sensitive capability
  • moe_deployno sensitive capability
  • ollama_chatno sensitive capability
  • ollama_generateno sensitive capability
  • ollama_listno sensitive capability
  • ollama_model_infono sensitive capability
  • ollama_pullno sensitive capability
  • optimizeno sensitive capability
  • orchestrator_evictno sensitive capability
  • orchestrator_inferno sensitive capability
  • orchestrator_loadno sensitive capability
  • orchestrator_registerno sensitive capability
  • orchestrator_startno sensitive capability
  • orchestrator_statusno sensitive capability
  • phoenix_k8sno sensitive capability
  • phoenix_otel_envno sensitive capability
  • phoenix_projectsno sensitive capability
  • phoenix_snippetno sensitive capability
  • phoenix_spansno sensitive capability
  • phoenix_testno sensitive capability
  • phoenix_traceno sensitive capability
  • preflightno sensitive capability
  • preflight_gpu_checkno sensitive capability
  • preflight_network_checkno sensitive capability
  • preflight_reportno sensitive capability
  • price_budget_optimizeno sensitive capability
  • price_discoveryno sensitive capability
  • price_intelno sensitive capability
  • price_spot_riskno sensitive capability
  • price_trendsno sensitive capability
  • provision_gpuno sensitive capability
  • qdrant_collectionsno sensitive capability
  • qdrant_countno sensitive capability
  • qdrant_create_collectionno sensitive capability
  • qdrant_infono sensitive capability
  • qdrant_k8sno sensitive capability
  • qdrant_testno sensitive capability
  • quote_gpuno sensitive capability
  • ray_list_jobsno sensitive capability
  • ray_parallelism_strategyno sensitive capability
  • ray_startno sensitive capability
  • ray_statusno sensitive capability
  • ray_stopno sensitive capability
  • rollbackno sensitive capability
  • run_workflowno sensitive capability
  • setup_providerno sensitive capability
  • sglang_inferenceno sensitive capability
  • sglang_metricsno sensitive capability
  • sglang_startno sensitive capability
  • sglang_stopno sensitive capability
  • smart_deployno sensitive capability
  • stageno sensitive capability
  • statusno sensitive capability
  • terraform_applyno sensitive capability
  • terraform_destroyno sensitive capability
  • terraform_planno sensitive capability
  • terraform_statusno sensitive capability
  • train_detect_stragglersno sensitive capability
  • train_monitorno sensitive capability
  • train_resumeno sensitive capability
  • train_snapshotno sensitive capability
  • train_statusno sensitive capability
  • train_stopno sensitive capability
  • upno sensitive capability
  • vllm_inferenceno sensitive capability
  • vllm_infono sensitive capability
  • vllm_sleepno sensitive capability
  • vllm_startno sensitive capability
  • vllm_stopno sensitive capability
  • vllm_wakeno sensitive capability
  • wandb_create_dashboardno sensitive capability
  • wandb_create_reportno sensitive capability
  • wandb_create_terradev_alertsno sensitive capability
  • wandb_create_terradev_dashboardno sensitive capability
  • wandb_create_terradev_reportno sensitive capability
  • wandb_dashboard_statusno sensitive capability
  • wandb_list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • wandb_list_runsno sensitive capability
  • wandb_run_detailsno sensitive capability
  • wandb_setup_alertsno sensitive capability
  • warm_pool_startno sensitive capability
  • warm_pool_statusno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.0.8 latest A 93/100 22 1.13.0 2026-08-25

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MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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