Terno Dbi MCP Server
terno-dbi
PyPI
v1.0.2
Published by ternoai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Database Intelligence Layer - Multi-database connectivity with SQLShield integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (src/terno_dbi/examples/agents/llm_interface.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/terno_dbi/examples/agents/llm_interface.py:60`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: response = requests.post( "https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/terno_dbi/examples/agents/llm_interface.py
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_queryreads sensitive dataadd_datasourceno sensitive capabilityconnect_datasourceno sensitive capabilitydelete_datasourceno sensitive capabilitydelete_memoryno sensitive capabilityedit_memoryno sensitive capabilityedit_org_promptno sensitive capabilityget_memoryno sensitive capabilityget_org_promptno sensitive capabilityget_sample_datano sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
get_table_infono sensitive capabilitygrep_memoryno sensitive capabilitygrep_org_promptno sensitive capabilitylist_datasourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_foreign_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_table_columnsno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilityrename_columnno sensitive capabilityrename_tableno sensitive capabilitysave_memoryno sensitive capabilitysync_metadatano sensitive capabilityterno_guideno sensitive capabilityupdate_column_descriptionno sensitive capabilityupdate_org_promptno sensitive capabilityupdate_table_descriptionno sensitive capabilityvalidate_connectionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v1.0.1 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.1.42 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.1.37 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v0.1.36 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v0.1.34 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.1.33 |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v0.1.31 |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan terno-dbi --online --registry pypiMore in Databases
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