Terminal Use — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "terminal-use-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "terminal-use-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "terminal-use-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"terminal.start\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"terminal.start\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "terminal.start"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/providers/system-ssh-transport.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/system-ssh-transport.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/system-ssh-transport.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { SshAuthFailedError, SshConnectTimeoutError, SshHostKeyMismatchError, Ss",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/providers/system-ssh-transport.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/providers/tmux-provider.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/providers/tmux-provider.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/providers/tmux-provider.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\"; import { parsedKeyToTmuxKey } from \".",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/providers/tmux-provider.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/targets/ssh-auth.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/targets/ssh-auth.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/targets/ssh-auth.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { expandTildePath } from \"./ssh-host-config",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/targets/ssh-auth.js",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/targets/ssh-keyscan-verify.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/targets/ssh-keyscan-verify.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/targets/ssh-keyscan-verify.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { closeSync, openSync, writeSync, unlinkSync, existsSync } from \"node:fs\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/targets/ssh-keyscan-verify.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/tool-helpers.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/tool-helpers.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/tool-helpers.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { execSshTmux } from \"../providers/ssh-tmux-provider.js\"; import { loadHo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/tool-helpers.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"terminal.start\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"terminal.start\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "terminal.start",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"terminal.start\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"terminal.start\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "terminal.start"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "terminal.attach",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.cleanup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.export_transcript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.find",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.kill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.mouse_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.mouse_scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.paste",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.press",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.provider_capabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.rename",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.resize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.send_signal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.start",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.target_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.targets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.tmux_kill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.tmux_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.verify_target",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.wait_for_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "terminal.wait_stable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "45f09ddcdc9078bf755cc00748d73507e2618a16e79552a5868eb30f5f3cc52a",
"stats": {
"tools": 29,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}