Terminal (mkpvishnu) MCP Server
terminal-mcp
PyPI
v0.4.7
Published by mkpvishnu — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for interactive terminal sessions (SSH, REPLs, database CLIs)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Tool "session_create" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "session_create" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool session_create
high Tool "session_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "session_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool session_exec
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "session_create"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "session_create" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool session_create · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "exec" on "session_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "session_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "exec" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool session_exec · inputSchema.properties.exec
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "session_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "session_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool session_exec · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "session_create" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "session_create" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool session_create
low Mutating tool "session_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "session_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool session_exec
Tools 9
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
session_createruns code / shellsession_execruns code / shellsession_closeno sensitive capabilitysession_interactno sensitive capabilitysession_listno sensitive capabilitysession_readno sensitive capabilitysession_resizeno sensitive capabilitysession_sendno sensitive capabilitysession_wait_forno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.4.6 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan terminal-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Terminal 11
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 12 side by side →
Reserved for future use
A headless terminal emulator exposed via MCP for AI assistants
MCP Terminal Server - Execute commands within allowed paths
Secure terminal command execution for Model-Context-Protocol servers
Terminal Mcp Server
A secure terminal execution server implementing the Model Context Protocol (MCP). This server provides controlled command execution capabilities with security features and resource limits.
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