Tenets MCP Server
tenets
PyPI
v0.13.3
Published by jddunn — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for AI coding assistants — intelligent code context via Model Context Protocol
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tenets/core/analysis/analyzer.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`tenets/core/analysis/analyzer.py:566`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: torconfig", ".npmrc", ".yarnrc", ".nvmrc", } if file_path.name in sp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/core/analysis/analyzer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tenets/cli/app.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tenets/cli/app.py:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ocess result = subprocess.run( ["git", "--version"], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/cli/app.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tenets/cli/commands/distill.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tenets/cli/commands/distill.py:508`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(["open", folder], check=False) else: # Linux
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/cli/commands/distill.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tenets/cli/commands/rank.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tenets/cli/commands/rank.py:366`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(["open", folder], check=False) else: # Linux
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/cli/commands/rank.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tenets/cli/commands/system_instruction.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tenets/cli/commands/system_instruction.py:438`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Open editor subprocess.call([editor, tmp_path]) # Read edited content with open(tmp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/cli/commands/system_instruction.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tenets/core/git/analyzer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tenets/core/git/analyzer.py:399`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(self.root), capture_output=True, text=True, tim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/core/git/analyzer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tenets/core/git/blame.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tenets/core/git/blame.py:399`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: me result = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=repo_path, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True) # Pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/core/git/blame.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tenets/core/git/stats.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tenets/core/git/stats.py:526`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "log", "--reverse", "--format=%at", "-1"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/core/git/stats.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (tenets/storage/cache.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`tenets/storage/cache.py:130`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return pickle.loads(value_blob) # nosec except Exception as e: sel
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tenets/storage/cache.py
Tools 10
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
tenets_chronicleno sensitive capabilitytenets_distillno sensitive capabilitytenets_examineno sensitive capabilitytenets_get_tool_schemano sensitive capabilitytenets_momentumno sensitive capabilitytenets_rank_filesno sensitive capabilitytenets_search_toolsno sensitive capabilitytenets_sessionno sensitive capabilitytenets_system_instructionno sensitive capabilitytenets_tenetno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.13.3 latest |
B 87/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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