Plain (tellahq) MCP Server

@tellahq/plain-mcp npm v1.2.0

Published by @tellahq — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Plain.com support platform

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([change_thread_priority]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, send_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [change_thread_priority] → sinks [create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, send_email]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow change_thread_priority → create_webhook

Tools 78

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • change_thread_priorityingests untrusted input
  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • send_emailnetwork egress
  • update_webhooknetwork egress
  • add_customer_to_groupsno sensitive capability
  • add_labels_to_threadno sensitive capability
  • assign_threadno sensitive capability
  • change_thread_status_to_todono sensitive capability
  • create_autoresponderno sensitive capability
Show 68 more tools ↓
  • create_customer_eventno sensitive capability
  • create_customer_groupno sensitive capability
  • create_help_centerno sensitive capability
  • create_help_center_article_groupno sensitive capability
  • create_knowledge_sourceno sensitive capability
  • create_label_typeno sensitive capability
  • create_noteno sensitive capability
  • create_snippetno sensitive capability
  • create_threadno sensitive capability
  • create_thread_eventno sensitive capability
  • create_tierno sensitive capability
  • delete_autoresponderno sensitive capability
  • delete_companyno sensitive capability
  • delete_customerno sensitive capability
  • delete_help_centerno sensitive capability
  • delete_help_center_articleno sensitive capability
  • delete_help_center_article_groupno sensitive capability
  • delete_knowledge_sourceno sensitive capability
  • delete_noteno sensitive capability
  • delete_snippetno sensitive capability
  • delete_tenantno sensitive capability
  • delete_threadno sensitive capability
  • delete_tierno sensitive capability
  • generate_help_center_articleno sensitive capability
  • get_customerno sensitive capability
  • get_help_centerno sensitive capability
  • get_help_center_articleno sensitive capability
  • get_help_center_article_by_slugno sensitive capability
  • get_help_center_article_groupno sensitive capability
  • get_help_center_indexno sensitive capability
  • get_queue_statsno sensitive capability
  • get_threadno sensitive capability
  • get_workspaceno sensitive capability
  • list_autorespondersno sensitive capability
  • list_customer_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_help_center_article_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_help_center_articlesno sensitive capability
  • list_help_centersno sensitive capability
  • list_label_typesno sensitive capability
  • list_snippetsno sensitive capability
  • list_thread_field_schemasno sensitive capability
  • list_threadsno sensitive capability
  • list_tiersno sensitive capability
  • list_usersno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • mark_customer_as_spamno sensitive capability
  • mark_thread_doneno sensitive capability
  • mark_thread_todono sensitive capability
  • remove_customer_from_groupsno sensitive capability
  • remove_labels_from_threadno sensitive capability
  • reply_to_threadno sensitive capability
  • search_customersno sensitive capability
  • send_chatno sensitive capability
  • snooze_threadno sensitive capability
  • unassign_threadno sensitive capability
  • unmark_customer_as_spamno sensitive capability
  • update_help_centerno sensitive capability
  • update_help_center_article_groupno sensitive capability
  • update_help_center_custom_domainno sensitive capability
  • update_help_center_indexno sensitive capability
  • update_snippetno sensitive capability
  • update_thread_titleno sensitive capability
  • upsert_companyno sensitive capability
  • upsert_customerno sensitive capability
  • upsert_help_center_articleno sensitive capability
  • upsert_tenantno sensitive capability
  • upsert_thread_fieldno sensitive capability
  • verify_help_center_custom_domainno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.2.0 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-09

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @tellahq/plain-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Plain 1

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →

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