Telique MCP Server
telique-mcp
npm
v1.0.32
Source verified
Published by ringer — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Telique telecom APIs (RouteLink, LRN, CNAM, LERG)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 0 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
✓ No adoption-risk deductions — minimal blast radius, verified enough, and fully inspected.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { stdin, stdout } from "node:process"; import { CONFIG_DIR, CONFIG_FILE }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`postinstall.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { join, dirname } from "node:pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server postinstall.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"telique-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package telique-mcp
Tools 14
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cnam_lookupno sensitive capabilitydno_checkno sensitive capabilitygraphql_queryno sensitive capabilitylerg_complex_queryno sensitive capabilitylerg_queryno sensitive capabilitylerg_table_infono sensitive capabilitylerg_tandemno sensitive capabilitylookup_tnno sensitive capabilitylrn_lookupno sensitive capabilitylrn_relationship_queryno sensitive capability
Show 4 more tools ↓
routelink_cprno sensitive capabilityroutelink_lookupno sensitive capabilityroutelink_ror_queryno sensitive capabilitytelique_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.32 latest |
A 99/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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