Telekash MCP Server
telekash-mcp-server
npm
v0.9.2
Published by telekashoracle — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Prediction market probability oracle + broker for AI agents. 23 tools across 500+ live markets from Kalshi & Polymarket. Smart trade routing with 1% commission, structured TPF signals, cross-source arbitrage, noise detection, agent performance tracking, t
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: list_markets → export_data → delete_alert. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow list_markets → export_data → delete_alert
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/broker.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/broker.js:346`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://clob.polymarket.com/time"); if (response.ok) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/broker.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/x402.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/x402.js:221`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://api.stripe.com/v1/payment_intents/${piId}`, { headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/x402.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "callback_url" on "register_alert"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "register_alert" takes a URL/host parameter "callback_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool register_alert · inputSchema.properties.callback_url
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/openbb-connector.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/openbb-connector.py:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } proc = subprocess.Popen( self._server_cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/openbb-connector.py
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_alertnetwork egressexport_datareads sensitive datalist_marketsingests untrusted inputregister_alertnetwork egresscancel_orderno sensitive capabilitycompare_sourcesno sensitive capabilitycreate_marketno sensitive capabilitydetect_arbitrageno sensitive capabilityexecute_tradeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_api_keyno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
get_agent_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_calibration_changelogno sensitive capabilityget_divergencesno sensitive capabilityget_edgeno sensitive capabilityget_healthno sensitive capabilityget_historyno sensitive capabilityget_market_statsno sensitive capabilityget_order_statusno sensitive capabilityget_performanceno sensitive capabilityget_pool_statusno sensitive capabilityget_probabilityno sensitive capabilityget_resolution_statusno sensitive capabilityget_sentimentno sensitive capabilityget_signalno sensitive capabilityget_trendingno sensitive capabilityget_usageno sensitive capabilitylist_alertsno sensitive capabilitysearch_marketsno sensitive capabilitytrack_predictionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan telekash-mcp-server --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.