Postgres (tejasanik) MCP Server
@tejasanik/postgres-mcp-server
npm
v3.0.3
Published by @tejasanik — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for PostgreSQL database management and analysis
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([execute_sql, execute_sql_file, preview_sql_file, mutation_preview, mutation_dry_run, dry_run_sql_file, batch_execute, begin_transaction, explain_query, lock_check, safe_alter_table]) and tools that can send data out ([export_to_sql_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [execute_sql, execute_sql_file, preview_sql_file, mutation_preview, mutation_dry_run, dry_run_sql_file, batch_execute, begin_transaction, explain_query,
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow execute_sql → export_to_sql_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "filePath" on "execute_sql_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "execute_sql_file" takes a path parameter "filePath" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool execute_sql_file · inputSchema.properties.filePath
low Unconstrained path parameter "filePath" on "preview_sql_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "preview_sql_file" takes a path parameter "filePath" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool preview_sql_file · inputSchema.properties.filePath
low Unconstrained path parameter "filePath" on "dry_run_sql_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "dry_run_sql_file" takes a path parameter "filePath" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool dry_run_sql_file · inputSchema.properties.filePath
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_executereads sensitive databegin_transactionreads sensitive datadry_run_sql_filereads sensitive dataexecute_sqlreads sensitive dataexecute_sql_filereads sensitive dataexplain_queryreads sensitive dataexport_to_sql_filenetwork egresslock_checkreads sensitive datamutation_dry_runreads sensitive datamutation_previewreads sensitive data
Show 26 more tools ↓
preview_sql_filereads sensitive datasafe_alter_tablereads sensitive dataanalyze_db_healthno sensitive capabilityanalyze_query_indexesno sensitive capabilityanalyze_workload_indexesno sensitive capabilitycolumn_profileno sensitive capabilitycommit_transactionno sensitive capabilitydescribe_tableno sensitive capabilitydetect_migration_stateno sensitive capabilityfind_blocking_queriesno sensitive capabilityfind_dependentsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_seed_datano sensitive capabilityget_current_connectionno sensitive capabilityget_object_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_top_queriesno sensitive capabilityget_transaction_infono sensitive capabilitykill_queryno sensitive capabilitylist_databasesno sensitive capabilitylist_objectsno sensitive capabilitylist_schemasno sensitive capabilitylist_serversno sensitive capabilitylist_transactionsno sensitive capabilityrollback_transactionno sensitive capabilityschema_diffno sensitive capabilityswitch_server_dbno sensitive capabilitytransfer_objectsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @tejasanik/postgres-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Postgres 38
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