Teamspeak MCP Server
teamspeak-mcp
PyPI
v1.5.2
Published by marlburrow — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
TeamSpeak MCP Server - Control TeamSpeak from AI models
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_files · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_filesreads sensitive dataadd_log_entryno sensitive capabilityassign_client_to_groupno sensitive capabilityban_clientno sensitive capabilitychannel_infono sensitive capabilityclient_info_detailedno sensitive capabilityconnect_to_serverno sensitive capabilitycreate_channelno sensitive capabilitycreate_privilege_tokenno sensitive capabilitycreate_server_groupno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
create_server_snapshotno sensitive capabilitydelete_channelno sensitive capabilitydeploy_server_snapshotno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_permissionsno sensitive capabilityfind_channelsno sensitive capabilityget_connection_infono sensitive capabilityget_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_instance_logsno sensitive capabilitykick_clientno sensitive capabilitylist_bansno sensitive capabilitylist_channelsno sensitive capabilitylist_clientsno sensitive capabilitylist_complaintsno sensitive capabilitylist_privilege_tokensno sensitive capabilitylist_server_groupsno sensitive capabilitymanage_ban_rulesno sensitive capabilitymanage_channel_permissionsno sensitive capabilitymanage_file_permissionsno sensitive capabilitymanage_server_group_permissionsno sensitive capabilitymanage_user_permissionsno sensitive capabilitymove_clientno sensitive capabilitypoke_clientno sensitive capabilitysearch_clientsno sensitive capabilitysend_channel_messageno sensitive capabilitysend_private_messageno sensitive capabilityserver_infono sensitive capabilityset_channel_talk_powerno sensitive capabilityupdate_channelno sensitive capabilityupdate_server_settingsno sensitive capabilityview_server_logsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan teamspeak-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in AI & Agents
Authenticated MCP transport with HTTP Signatures for AAuth agents
Local-first MCP server for parallel AI coding agents to claim file ownership before edits, preventing stomping on each other in the same worktree.
Agent-agnostic intercommunication system — sessions, messaging, channels, shared state, and real-time events
MCP server for AI agent task communication and delegation with diagnostic lifecycle visibility
Programmatic add/link/unlink for MCP servers across 23 AI coding agents (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Zed, Cline, OpenCode, Goose, Kiro, Windsurf, and more). Functional API with dry-run support.
MCP server layer exposing agent-mesh orchestrator as an MCP agent