Teammcp MCP Server
teammcp
npm
v1.0.2
Published by cookjohn — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP-native collaboration server for AI agent teams — real-time messaging, task management, and web dashboard
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 10.6 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 11 = 78. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/teammcp.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/teammcp.mjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join, dirname } from 'node:path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/teammcp.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (server/process-manager-mac.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server/process-manager-mac.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pawn, exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, copyFi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/process-manager-mac.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (server/process-manager-win.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server/process-manager-win.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, copyFi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/process-manager-win.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (server/process-manager.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server/process-manager.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, copyFi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/process-manager.mjs
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([download_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message, send_dm, upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_file] → sinks [send_message, send_dm, upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_file → send_message
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (server/process-manager-win.mjs)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`server/process-manager-win.mjs:38`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: olve, reject) => { exec(`powershell -NoProfile -Command "${command}"`, { shell: 'cmd.exe' }, (err, stdout, stderr)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/process-manager-win.mjs
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (server/process-manager.mjs)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`server/process-manager.mjs:38`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: olve, reject) => { exec(`powershell -NoProfile -Command "${command}"`, { shell: 'cmd.exe' }, (err, stdout, stderr)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/process-manager.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"teammcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package teammcp
Tools 45
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_fileingests untrusted inputsend_dmnetwork egresssend_messagenetwork egressupload_filenetwork egressack_inboxno sensitive capabilityacknowledge_knowledge_gapsno sensitive capabilityadd_reactionno sensitive capabilitycancel_scheduleno sensitive capabilitycheck_knowledge_gapsno sensitive capabilitycreate_channelno sensitive capability
Show 35 more tools ↓
create_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_messageno sensitive capabilitydone_taskno sensitive capabilityedit_messageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_audit_reportno sensitive capabilityget_agent_profileno sensitive capabilityget_agentsno sensitive capabilityget_audit_reportsno sensitive capabilityget_changelogno sensitive capabilityget_channelsno sensitive capabilityget_historyno sensitive capabilityget_inboxno sensitive capabilityget_pending_approvalsno sensitive capabilityget_pinned_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_public_reportsno sensitive capabilityget_stateno sensitive capabilityget_state_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilitypin_messageno sensitive capabilitypin_taskno sensitive capabilityremove_reactionno sensitive capabilityrequest_approvalno sensitive capabilityresolve_approvalno sensitive capabilityschedule_messageno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_agentno sensitive capabilitysearch_messagesno sensitive capabilitysend_keys_to_agentno sensitive capabilityset_stateno sensitive capabilitystart_agentno sensitive capabilitystop_agentno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_stateno sensitive capabilityunpin_messageno sensitive capabilityupdate_agent_profileno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
C 78/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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