Tauri Plugin (P3GLEG) MCP Server
tauri-plugin-mcp-server
npm
v0.3.1
Source verified
Published by p3gleg — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server that lets AI agents interact with and debug Tauri applications via the tauri-plugin-mcp socket (screenshots, DOM access, input simulation, log querying)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/tools/restart_app.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/restart_app.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { socketClient } from "./client.js"; import { createErrorResponse, create
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/restart_app.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/tools/restart_app.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/restart_app.js:13`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`lsof -U 2>/dev/null | grep "${socketPath}" | head -1`, { encoding: 'utf-8'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/restart_app.js
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
manage_storagereads sensitive dataapp_bridgeno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilitydispatch_pointerno sensitive capabilityexecute_jsno sensitive capabilityinspect_elementno sensitive capabilitylog_markno sensitive capabilitymanage_ipcno sensitive capabilitymanage_windowno sensitive capabilitymouse_actionno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
navigateno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityquery_logsno sensitive capabilityquery_pageno sensitive capabilityread_textno sensitive capabilityrestart_appno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.1 latest |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan tauri-plugin-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Tauri Plugin 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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