Tatine13 Manager MCP Server
@tatine13/mcp-manager
npm
v1.0.1
Published by @tatine13 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Universal MCP Server for Multi-Account Email Management with Personas, Tasks, and FTS5 Local Memory
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/cli.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { spawn, exec } from 'child_process'; import { z } from 'zod'; var DEFAULT_DATA_DIR = path2.join(os.homedir(), ".mail
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bin/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/server.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { spawn, exec } from 'child_process'; import { z } from 'zod'; var DEFAULT_DATA_DIR = path2.join(os.homedir(), ".mail
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bin/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { spawn, exec } from 'child_process'; import { z } from 'zod'; // src/core/server.ts var DEFAULT_DATA_DIR = path2.joi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([read_email, download_attachment]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, create_inbound_webhook, create_outbound_webhook, webhook_logs]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [read_email, download_attachment] → sinks [send_email, create_inbound_webhook, create_outbound_webhook, webhook_logs]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow read_email → send_email
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_inbound_webhooknetwork egresscreate_outbound_webhooknetwork egressdownload_attachmentingests untrusted inputread_emailingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egresswebhook_logsnetwork egressadd_accountno sensitive capabilityadd_provider_presetno sensitive capabilitycreate_directiveno sensitive capabilitycreate_personano sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
create_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_directiveno sensitive capabilitydelete_emailno sensitive capabilitydelete_personano sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilityexecute_taskno sensitive capabilityget_email_historyno sensitive capabilityget_server_infono sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_directivesno sensitive capabilitylist_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_personasno sensitive capabilitylist_provider_presetsno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymove_emailno sensitive capabilityremove_accountno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_local_emailsno sensitive capabilitysync_emailsno sensitive capabilitytest_connectionno sensitive capabilitytest_directiveno sensitive capabilityupdate_personano sensitive capabilityvault_statusno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @tatine13/mcp-manager --onlineOther implementations of Tatine13 Manager 4
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