Taskflow Ai MCP Server
taskflow-ai
npm
v5.1.0
Source verified
Published by agions — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
TaskFlow AI - 精品 MCP Server，为 Claude / Cursor / Windsurf 等 AI 编辑器提供 40+ 强大工具能力，专注于 MCP 协议的完整实现
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 6 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/cicd/engine.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/cicd/engine.js:90`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); try { const remoteUrl = execSync('git remote get-url origin', { enc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/cicd/engine.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/doctor.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("chalk"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs_1 = __importDefault(require("fs")); functio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/stats.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/stats.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("chalk"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const logger = (0, logger_1.getLogger)('cli/commands
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/stats.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/upgrade.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/upgrade.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("chalk"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs_1 = __importDefault(require("fs")); exports
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/upgrade.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/tools/implementations/built-in.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/tools/implementations/built-in.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const command = commandPrefix ? `${commandPrefix} $
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/tools/implementations/built-in.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/marketplace/installer/dependencies.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/marketplace/installer/dependencies.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const logger_1 = require("../../utils/logger"); cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/marketplace/installer/dependencies.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/marketplace/installer/downloader.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/marketplace/installer/downloader.js:89`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: > __importStar(require('child_process'))); execSync(`git clone --depth 1 ${repo} ${targetDir}`, { stdio: 'ignore
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/marketplace/installer/downloader.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/server/executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/server/executor.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: * MCP 工具执行器 */ const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const types_1 = require("../tools/types"); const log
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/server/executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/tools/common.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/tools/common.js:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); // =================================================
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/tools/common.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/tools/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/tools/git.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = getCurrentHash; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const logger_1 = req
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/tools/git.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/marketplace/installer/downloader.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/marketplace/installer/downloader.js:90`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ld_process'))); execSync(`git clone --depth 1 ${repo} ${targetDir}`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); } async findE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/marketplace/installer/downloader.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/mcp/tools/auto-discover.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/tools/auto-discover.js:76`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .then(s => __importStar(require(s))); // 查找所有导出的工具数组 for (const exportName of Object.keys(mod))
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/tools/auto-discover.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"taskflow-ai" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: echo '🎉 TaskFlow AI 安装成功！运行 taskflow --help 开始使用'
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package taskflow-ai
Tools 2
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
Available Toolsno sensitive capabilityTaskFlow Configurationno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (2 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.1.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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