Task Trellis (langadventurellc) MCP Server

task-trellis-mcp PyPI v2.0.3

Published by langadventurellc — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
C
76/100
Last scanned
Trust
C · 76/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
C Why this grade 100 − 24.1 = 76/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−22 Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code MTC-SRC-008 exfiltration
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Grade capped: 1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 6

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/security/test_error_security.py)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`tests/security/test_error_security.py:267`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: id_rsa

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/security/test_error_security.py

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/security/test_inference_security_integration.py)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`tests/security/test_inference_security_integration.py:35`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: id_rsa

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/security/test_inference_security_integration.py

high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/security/test_error_security.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/security/test_error_security.py:73`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server tests/security/test_error_security.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/trellis_mcp/utils/sanitization.py)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`src/trellis_mcp/utils/sanitization.py:61`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/trellis_mcp/utils/sanitization.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (tests/unit/utils/test_sanitization.py)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`tests/unit/utils/test_sanitization.py:135`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/unit/utils/test_sanitization.py

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"task-trellis-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package task-trellis-mcp

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.0.3 latest C 76/100 6 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: C · 76/100
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