Tankpkg MCP Server
@tankpkg/mcp-server
npm
v0.16.5
Source verified
Published by tankpkg — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Tank - scan and publish AI agent skills from your editor
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:8101`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const skillDir = getSkillDir(dir, name); if (fs.existsSync(skillDir)) fs.rm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:8111`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: allBuffer)); try { execSync(`tar xzf "${tarballPath}" -C "${skillDir}" --strip-components=1`, { stdio: "pipe" });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Tool "unlink-skill" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink-skill" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink-skill
low Mutating tool "unlink-skill" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink-skill" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink-skill
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
unlink-skillwrites filesaudit-skillno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilityinit-skillno sensitive capabilityinstall-skillno sensitive capabilitylink-skillno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilitylogoutno sensitive capabilitypublish-skillno sensitive capabilityremove-skillno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
scan-skillno sensitive capabilitysearch-skillsno sensitive capabilityskill-infono sensitive capabilityskill-permissionsno sensitive capabilityupdate-skillno sensitive capabilityverify-skillsno sensitive capabilitywhoamino sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.16.5 latest |
B 88/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @tankpkg/mcp-server --onlineMore in Content Management
Apify MCP Server
Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server for the *@inkeep/agents-mcp* API.
Medicare spending, chronic conditions, hospital quality, readmissions, and enrollment
Public read-only MCP for products, frameworks, guides, methodology, and blog metadata.
Community-maintained MCP server for Atlassian Confluence Data Center. Not affiliated with Atlassian.
MCP server for Contentful Content Management API integration