Raw scan report

TAI Email — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.5.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "tai-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "tai-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "tai-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 98,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 2.1,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
        "category": "supply-chain",
        "severity": "low",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 3,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 2.1
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/services/email-poller.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`build/src/services/email-poller.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "build/src/services/email-poller.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "build/src/services/email-poller.js",
        "line": 1
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/inspector.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`scripts/inspector.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "scripts/inspector.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "scripts/inspector.js",
        "line": 4
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/services/email-poller.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/services/email-poller.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/services/email-poller.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/services/email-poller.ts",
        "line": 1
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
      "title": "Package has no source repository",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"tai-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
      "remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "tai-mcp"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "3d2d9652778560839424800c903b097ec5c8c49c57faf0a4574a63f7332a5621",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 3,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 1,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}