Tableau MCP Server
@tableau/mcp-server
npm
v4.8.1
Source verified
Published by tableau — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Helping agents see and understand data.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:48`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode.process(u,t));let m=new Function(`${gm.default.self}`,`${gm.default.scope}`,u)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:108`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec:xRt}=require("node:child_process"),{promisify:wRt}=require("node:util"),{setCredentialFeature:_Rt}=(Ht(),Ae(hl)),SR
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:142`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'require "%s"',o);var i=require(o).__express;if(typeof i!="function")throw new Error('Module "'+o+'" does not provide a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (build/telemetry/tracing.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`build/telemetry/tracing.js:2`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .cwd(),t):r=t;try{let o=require(r),i=o.default||o.TelemetryProvider;if(!i)throw new Error(`Module ${t} must export a def
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/telemetry/tracing.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.8.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v4.7.1 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v4.6.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v4.5.4 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v4.5.1 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v4.3.2 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v4.2.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v4.0.4 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v3.6.0 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v3.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @tableau/mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Tableau 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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