Systems Manager MCP Server
systems-manager
PyPI
v1.36.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Systems Manager will update your system and install/upgrade applications. Additionally, as allow AI to perform these activities as an MCP Server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (systems_manager/k8s_detect.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`systems_manager/k8s_detect.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( # nosec - fixed, non-shell, read-only commands cmd, capture_output=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server systems_manager/k8s_detect.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (systems_manager/os_health.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`systems_manager/os_health.py:110`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ne. completed = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 - fixed argv, no shell, no user input argv,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server systems_manager/os_health.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (systems_manager/os_provider.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`systems_manager/os_provider.py:132`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "] result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True) services = []
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server systems_manager/os_provider.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (systems_manager/sudo_helper.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`systems_manager/sudo_helper.py:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ve pagers res = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server systems_manager/sudo_helper.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (systems_manager/systems_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`systems_manager/systems_manager.py:227`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: er.run_command(cmd[-1], shell=True) # nosec else: result = self.manager.run_command(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server systems_manager/systems_manager.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/security_sanitizer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/security_sanitizer.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "ls-files", "--cached", "--others", "--exclude-standard"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/security_sanitizer.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_platform_managers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_platform_managers.py:297`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: sh/uv/install.sh | sh", shell=True ) # install_uv Windows with ( patch("platform.system", retur
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_platform_managers.py
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
capture_system_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_network_connectionsno sensitive capabilityget_process_detailsno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilitylist_kernel_modulesno sensitive capabilitylist_servicesno sensitive capabilitymanage_serviceno sensitive capabilityquery_system_logsno sensitive capabilitysm_advanced_operationsno sensitive capabilitysm_cron_operationsno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
sm_disk_operationsno sensitive capabilitysm_file_operationsno sensitive capabilitysm_firewall_operationsno sensitive capabilitysm_network_operationsno sensitive capabilitysm_process_operationsno sensitive capabilitysm_service_operationsno sensitive capabilitysm_storage_healthno sensitive capabilitysm_system_operationsno sensitive capabilitysm_user_operationsno sensitive capabilitystart_system_traceno sensitive capabilitystop_system_traceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.36.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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