Synterai MCP Server
@synterai/mcp-server
npm
v1.2.4
Published by @synterai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AI agents to manage ad campaigns across Google, Meta, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Reddit, TikTok, and more. Create campaigns, adjust budgets, generate creatives, and pull performance data through natural conversation.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "stage_audience_artifact" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "stage_audience_artifact" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool stage_audience_artifact
high Tool "run_tool" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_tool" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_tool
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_name" on "stage_audience_artifact"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "stage_audience_artifact" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_name" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool stage_audience_artifact · inputSchema.properties.script_name
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_name" on "run_tool"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_tool" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_name" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_tool · inputSchema.properties.script_name
low Mutating tool "stage_audience_artifact" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "stage_audience_artifact" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool stage_audience_artifact
low Mutating tool "run_tool" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_tool" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_tool
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
run_toolruns code / shellstage_audience_artifactruns code / shelladd_keywordsno sensitive capabilityadd_negative_keywordsno sensitive capabilitycreate_conversionno sensitive capabilitycreate_display_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_linkedin_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_meta_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_pmax_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_reddit_campaignno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
create_search_campaignno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_trackingno sensitive capabilitygenerate_imageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_videono sensitive capabilityget_daily_spendno sensitive capabilityget_performanceno sensitive capabilitylist_ad_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylist_conversionsno sensitive capabilitylist_landing_pagesno sensitive capabilitymanage_audienceno sensitive capabilitypause_campaignno sensitive capabilitysync_audienceno sensitive capabilityupdate_campaign_budgetno sensitive capabilityupload_imageno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.2.3 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.2.1 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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