Synapse Cortex MCP Server
synapse-cortex
npm
v2026.5.4
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Powerful, self-contained AI context layer. Combines persistent memory, temporal knowledge graph, and hybrid code search into one local engine. Zero cloud, 100% private.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/_boot.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/_boot.cjs:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); const { resolve, basename } = require('node:path'); const pkgDir = resolve(__d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/_boot.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/_shared.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/_shared.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; /** * Ensure tsx/esm is loaded. If running without --import tsx/esm * (e.g. t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/_shared.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/core/engine/retrieval/chunker/ast-utils.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/core/engine/retrieval/chunker/ast-utils.ts:60`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: \s+/.test(trimmed) || /^require(_once)?\s*/.test(trimmed) || /^include(_once)?\s*/.test(trimmed)) push(line); cont
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/engine/retrieval/chunker/ast-utils.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/core/runtime/diagnostics.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/core/runtime/diagnostics.ts:134`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: /stdio.js'; await import(mcpPath); await import(stdioPath); return { id: 'sdk_import', ok: true, detai
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/runtime/diagnostics.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/synapse-post-tool.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/synapse-post-tool.cjs:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); const os = require('os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/hooks/synapse-post-tool.cjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/hooks/synapse-pre-tool.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/hooks/synapse-pre-tool.cjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const os = require('os'); const path = require('path'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/hooks/synapse-pre-tool.cjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/quality/quality-audit.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/quality/quality-audit.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path'; const npmCache = path.j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/quality/quality-audit.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/quality/quality-package.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/quality/quality-package.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; const tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'synapse-publint-')); con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/quality/quality-package.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/quality/test-install.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/quality/test-install.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, renameSync } from 'fs'; import { tmpdir } from 'os
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/quality/test-install.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/runtime/doctor-synapse.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/runtime/doctor-synapse.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { buildSynapsePaths, findSqliteVecExtensionPath, resolveConfigPath
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/runtime/doctor-synapse.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/runtime/install-synapse-skill.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/runtime/install-synapse-skill.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; const argv = process.argv.slice(2); // ANSI Colors const C = { reset: '\x1b[
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/runtime/install-synapse-skill.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/runtime/preinstall-cleanup.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/runtime/preinstall-cleanup.mjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; const PKG_NAME = 'synapse-cortex'; const isWindows = process.platform === 'win3
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/runtime/preinstall-cleanup.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"synapse-cortex" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "try{require('child_process').execSync('node scripts/runtime/install-synapse-skill.mjs --quiet',{stdio:'ignore'})}catch(e){}"
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package synapse-cortex
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2026.5.4 latest |
A 91/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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