Symbols (PyPI) MCP Server
symbols-mcp
PyPI
v3.14.764
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Symbols.app MCP — docs, code generation, publishing, CLI/SDK reference
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/symbols-audit.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/symbols-audit.cjs:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process') const FRANK_AUDIT_BIN = process.env.FRANK_AUDIT_BIN || 'frank-audit' const arg
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/symbols-audit.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/symbols-mcp-init-rules.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/symbols-mcp-init-rules.cjs:76`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = require('node:child_process') execSync(process.platform === 'win32' ? `where ${name}` : `command -v ${name
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/symbols-mcp-init-rules.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/symbols-mcp.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/symbols-mcp.cjs:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = require('node:child_process').spawnSync('node', [target, ...argv.slice(1)], { stdio: 'inherit' }) process.ex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/symbols-mcp.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/audit.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/audit.js:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process') const FRANK_AUDIT_BIN = process.env.FRANK_AUDIT_BIN || 'frank-audit' const FRAN
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/audit.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (symbols_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`symbols_mcp/server.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, input=stdin_data, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server symbols_mcp/server.py
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
audit_componentingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datagenerate_pageingests untrusted inputapply_frankability_edit_opsno sensitive capabilityaudit_and_fix_frankabilityno sensitive capabilityaudit_projectno sensitive capabilityconvert_htmlno sensitive capabilityconvert_reactno sensitive capabilityconvert_to_jsonno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitydetect_environmentno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
explain_frankability_ruleno sensitive capabilityfrankability_logno sensitive capabilitygenerate_componentno sensitive capabilityget_cli_referenceno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_project_contextno sensitive capabilityget_project_rulesno sensitive capabilityget_sdk_referenceno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilityprescribe_frankability_fixesno sensitive capabilitypublishno sensitive capabilitypushno sensitive capabilityrollback_frankabilityno sensitive capabilitysave_to_projectno sensitive capabilitysearch_symbols_docsno sensitive capabilitysnapshots_frankabilityno sensitive capabilityverify_frankabilityno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.14.764 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v3.14.763 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v3.14.754 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v3.14.711 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v3.14.659 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v3.14.656 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v3.14.653 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v3.14.648 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
v3.14.599 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v3.14.595 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan symbols-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Symbols 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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