Swipium MCP Server
swipium
npm
v1.5.0
Source verified
Published by geropalombo — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/init.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync, appendFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/android.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/android.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'; import { homedir }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/android.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/spawn.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/spawn.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { basename } from 'node:path'; /** Default kill timer for spawned command
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/spawn.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/session/processRegistry.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/session/processRegistry.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { withFileLock } from '../lib/lockfile.js'; import { log } from '../lib/l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/session/processRegistry.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/issues/reportBridge.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/issues/reportBridge.js:26`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st subsystem = detectSubsystem(`${f.detail} ${f.evidence ?? ''}`); return { title: `${f.kind}${f.screen ? `
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/issues/reportBridge.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "uri" on "qa_get_artifact"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "qa_get_artifact" takes a URL/host parameter "uri" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool qa_get_artifact · inputSchema.properties.uri
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/metro.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/metro.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { qaOk, qaError } from '../lib/result.js'; import { requireConsent, consu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/metro.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/screenRecord.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/screenRecord.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs'; import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/screenRecord.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/wda.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/wda.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, openSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/wda.js
Tools 72
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
qa_agent_briefingests untrusted inputqa_app_map_readingests untrusted inputqa_capabilitiesingests untrusted inputqa_exploreingests untrusted inputqa_get_artifactingests untrusted inputqa_actno sensitive capabilityqa_app_controlno sensitive capabilityqa_app_map_buildno sensitive capabilityqa_app_map_feature_scopeno sensitive capabilityqa_app_map_queryno sensitive capability
Show 62 more tools ↓
qa_app_map_updateno sensitive capabilityqa_assert_visualno sensitive capabilityqa_automation_validateno sensitive capabilityqa_buildno sensitive capabilityqa_bundletoolno sensitive capabilityqa_check_healthno sensitive capabilityqa_clear_overlayno sensitive capabilityqa_continue_from_blockerno sensitive capabilityqa_detect_contextno sensitive capabilityqa_device_infono sensitive capabilityqa_doctorno sensitive capabilityqa_explain_blockerno sensitive capabilityqa_first_runno sensitive capabilityqa_flow_checkno sensitive capabilityqa_flow_compileno sensitive capabilityqa_flow_repairno sensitive capabilityqa_flow_runno sensitive capabilityqa_generateno sensitive capabilityqa_geolocationno sensitive capabilityqa_inspectno sensitive capabilityqa_iosno sensitive capabilityqa_issue_logno sensitive capabilityqa_job_cancelno sensitive capabilityqa_job_statusno sensitive capabilityqa_locator_suggestno sensitive capabilityqa_metrono sensitive capabilityqa_mobile_auditno sensitive capabilityqa_networkno sensitive capabilityqa_next_best_actionno sensitive capabilityqa_noteno sensitive capabilityqa_orientationno sensitive capabilityqa_permissionsno sensitive capabilityqa_planno sensitive capabilityqa_prepare_ios_targetno sensitive capabilityqa_prepare_targetno sensitive capabilityqa_reportno sensitive capabilityqa_report_compareno sensitive capabilityqa_resolve_artifactno sensitive capabilityqa_resolve_targetno sensitive capabilityqa_run_historyno sensitive capabilityqa_screen_infono sensitive capabilityqa_screen_recordno sensitive capabilityqa_screenshotno sensitive capabilityqa_seedno sensitive capabilityqa_smokeno sensitive capabilityqa_snapshotno sensitive capabilityqa_start_sessionno sensitive capabilityqa_state_prepareno sensitive capabilityqa_state_teardownno sensitive capabilityqa_state_verifyno sensitive capabilityqa_statusno sensitive capabilityqa_suite_exportno sensitive capabilityqa_suite_generateno sensitive capabilityqa_suite_lintno sensitive capabilityqa_suite_readno sensitive capabilityqa_suite_updateno sensitive capabilityqa_test_featureno sensitive capabilityqa_test_thisno sensitive capabilityqa_visualno sensitive capabilityqa_visual_find_textno sensitive capabilityqa_waitno sensitive capabilityqa_wdano sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (72 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.0 latest |
B 84/100 | 9 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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