Swarm Kb — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "swarm-kb",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "swarm-kb"
},
"server": {
"name": "swarm-kb"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 71,
"threatScore": 78,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"gateCap": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 22,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 1,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 22
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [
"1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C"
],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/test_hardening.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"description": "A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/test_hardening.py:92`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_hardening.py"
},
"evidence": "AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "aws-access-key",
"file": "tests/test_hardening.py",
"line": 92
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/swarm_kb/hardening_session.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/swarm_kb/hardening_session.py:212`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/swarm_kb/hardening_session.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/swarm_kb/hardening_session.py",
"line": 212
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/swarm_kb/release_session.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/swarm_kb/release_session.py:255`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/swarm_kb/release_session.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/swarm_kb/release_session.py",
"line": 255
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"swarm-kb\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "swarm-kb"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "kb_post_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_get_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_update_decision_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_post_debate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_get_debates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_start_debate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_propose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_critique",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_vote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_get_transcript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_cancel_debate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_list_pipelines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_get_quality_gate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_start_idea_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_capture_idea_answer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_record_idea_alternatives",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_finalize_idea_design",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_start_plan_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_finalize_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_run_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_get_hardening_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_start_release",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_propose_version_bump",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_generate_changelog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_build_dist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_release_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_quick_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_quick_fix",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_check_claude_md",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_get_verification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_get_pgve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kb_get_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "ae81e6eff33ac8f62f87b878d27d2acaf6b277a25b1a531b94dee2cb01f3756e",
"stats": {
"tools": 32,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}