Svg (georgeharker) MCP Server
svg-mcp
PyPI
v0.7.1
Published by georgeharker — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A FastMCP server exposing structured, hierarchical SVG authoring with a render-and-see feedback loop.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (plugins/opencode/src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`plugins/opencode/src/index.ts:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process" import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs" import { homedir } from "node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugins/opencode/src/index.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (plugins/opencode/src/sharedserver-resolve.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`plugins/opencode/src/sharedserver-resolve.ts:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process" import { existsSync, mkdirSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugins/opencode/src/sharedserver-resolve.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (plugins/pi/src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`plugins/pi/src/index.ts:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process" import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs" impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugins/pi/src/index.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (plugins/pi/src/pi.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`plugins/pi/src/pi.ts:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: CommandSpec): void exec(command: string, args: string[], options?: ExecOptions): Promise<ExecResult> sendMessag
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugins/pi/src/pi.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (plugins/pi/src/sharedserver-resolve.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`plugins/pi/src/sharedserver-resolve.ts:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process" import { existsSync, mkdirSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugins/pi/src/sharedserver-resolve.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/svg_mcp/render/export.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/svg_mcp/render/export.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: vg)) proc = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, check=False, timeout=60) if proc.returncod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/svg_mcp/render/export.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/svg_mcp/render/resvg.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/svg_mcp/render/resvg.py:66`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: proc = subprocess.run( args, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/svg_mcp/render/resvg.py
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
set_preview_backdropnetwork egressconvert_unitsno sensitive capabilitycurrent_contextno sensitive capabilitydescribe_documentno sensitive capabilitydescribe_nodeno sensitive capabilityexport_formatsno sensitive capabilityexport_renderno sensitive capabilityexport_svgno sensitive capabilityextract_imageno sensitive capabilityfindno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
get_bboxno sensitive capabilityget_computed_styleno sensitive capabilityget_filterno sensitive capabilityget_geometryno sensitive capabilityget_paramsno sensitive capabilityget_subtreeno sensitive capabilityget_transformno sensitive capabilitylist_documentsno sensitive capabilitylist_fontsno sensitive capabilitylist_guidesno sensitive capabilitylist_layersno sensitive capabilitylist_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_resourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_stylesno sensitive capabilitymeasure_textno sensitive capabilityoutlineno sensitive capabilitypath_bboxno sensitive capabilityrender_backendsno sensitive capabilityrender_documentno sensitive capabilityrender_svgno sensitive capabilitystart_previewno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.7.0 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v0.6.2 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.6.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v0.4.4 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan svg-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Svg 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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