Surge MCP Server
surge-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for controlling Surge proxy via HTTP API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "surge_evaluate_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "surge_evaluate_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool surge_evaluate_script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_name" on "surge_evaluate_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "surge_evaluate_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_name" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool surge_evaluate_script · inputSchema.properties.script_name
low Mutating tool "surge_evaluate_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "surge_evaluate_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool surge_evaluate_script
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
surge_evaluate_scriptruns code / shellsurge_flush_dnsno sensitive capabilitysurge_get_feature_statusno sensitive capabilitysurge_get_outbound_modeno sensitive capabilitysurge_get_policy_groupno sensitive capabilitysurge_get_profileno sensitive capabilitysurge_kill_requestno sensitive capabilitysurge_list_devicesno sensitive capabilitysurge_list_modulesno sensitive capabilitysurge_list_policiesno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
surge_list_requestsno sensitive capabilitysurge_list_scriptsno sensitive capabilitysurge_modify_deviceno sensitive capabilitysurge_reload_profileno sensitive capabilitysurge_set_outbound_modeno sensitive capabilitysurge_set_policy_groupno sensitive capabilitysurge_test_policyno sensitive capabilitysurge_toggle_featureno sensitive capabilitysurge_toggle_moduleno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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